This article examines the possibility that two factors simultaneously motivate nonrecipient demand for income redistribution. The empirical analysis indicates that
support for food stamp program benefits can be explained within a public good
framework, while Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits are
desired as personal insurance against randomness in income as well as for the public
good characteristics of the program. The presence of more than one motivation helps
to explain the many differences in income-redistribution programs currently found
in the United States.
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