This article investigates the impact of earmarking on tax revenues. By dedicat-ing revenues to a particular purpose, earmarking overcomes a free-rider
problem among interest groups. The group receiving the benefits of the dedi cated revenues has a strong incentive to lobby for higher effective tax rates.
This hypothesis is tested using data on the federal gasoline tax.
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