This article will (1) respecify existing empirical work on sunk nontransferable
investments in terms of Jacobsen's work on campaign expenditures, (2) control
for
the effect of past political brand name possessed by the challenger on entry
barriers, and (3) discuss the theoretical difference between the long-run and
short-run effects of campaign expenditure limit laws. Considerations for the
ideal form of campaign expenditure limit laws will also be discussed.
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