An uncertainty model with a choice of free-riding is presented. The model does not provide theoretical justification to support a conclusion that rational individuals will always choose to free-ride. In the case of a contributor, a smaller likelihood of the undesirable event and a less effective benefit production function both lead to a smaller contribution by an individual. However, an individual who becomes more risk-averse, depending on the probability of the undesirable event and the effectiveness of the benefit production function, might choose to make either a larger or smaller contribution.
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