Compliance Costs and the Tax Avoidance-Tax Evasion Decision

Abstract

The analysis of the individual's choice of illegal tax evasion has typically ignored an alternative, legal method by which taxes can be reduced: tax avoidance. This article analyzes the joint individual choice of evasion and avoidance; it also examines optimal government policy in such a world. Its principal conclusion is that the existence of another channel for tax reduction alters many of the conclusions of the simpler evasion literature. Specifically, government policies that reduce evasion may not increase the tax base because avoidance may increase instead, and tax rate reductions may be a powerful tool for generating tax base increases because reductions make both evasion and avoidance less attractive. In addition, optimal government choices depend critically upon its objectives. The government selects larger values for its instruments when its goal is net revenue maximization or when those individuals who evade are not valued highly in its welfare function. It also appears that greater tax complexity generates more tax revenues.