In this article I design and simulate three conceptually different demand-oriented housing programs that are largely consistent with a set of normative rules that have been derived from the literature on efficient redistribution. The results suggest that the proposed in-kind transfer programs have desirable characteristics and are much more equitable than existing, construction-oriented public housing programs.
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