Why do we distribute income to the poor through government programs?
Spokespersons for the median voter/interdependent preferences and interest
group approaches to public policy determination present simple competing
models. Their listener observes that the two models, based on quite different
premises about voter preferences and how collective choices are made, yield
identical testable implications.
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