This article focuses on the goal of equalization of educational expenditures up to a minimum. The distribution of expenditures produced by three different aid formulas is examined. The response of local school districts to receipt of aid revenues is discussed, and an aid disbursement formula that could promote compliance with the aforementioned goal is proposed.
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