Niskanen contended that “high demand” committee review increases bureaucratic output, and the bureau appropriates the entire gain from expansion. This is inconsistent with the political behavior underlying Niskanen's analysis. The committee review system is designed to facilitate logrolling, so many of the benefits of overproduction must flow to legislators' constituencies.
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