The Buchanan and Tullock Constitutional Choice model is examined. It is
shown that it is important to distinguish between the concepts of negative and
positive voter power and between cases in whichfrequent voter recontracting is
and is not possible or likely to occur. Allowing for frequent voter recontracting
it is further shown that positive voter power—the power to take action on
behalf of the group rather than simply to prevent action from being taken—
must lie, in any meaningful sense, with a majority coalition.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Barton, D.M. (1973), "Constitutional choice and simple majority rule: comment", J. of Pol. Economy, 81: 971-79.
2.
Boadway, R. (1979), Public Sector Economics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall.
3.
Brown, C.V. and P.M. Jackson, (1978), Public Sector Economics, Martin Robert-son.
4.
Buchanan, J.M. (1959), "Positive economics, welfare economics and political economy", J. of Law and Econ.2: 124-138.
5.
——— and G., TULLOCK (1962), The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
6.
Dosser, D.G.M. (1967), "Economic Analysis of Tax Harmonization", in C. S. Shoup (ed.) Fiscal Harmonization in Common Markets. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
7.
Mueller, D.C. (1979), Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
8.
Tullock, G. (1973) "Constitutional choice and simple majority rule: reply." J. of Pol. Economy, 81: 480-84.
