This paper analyzes the extent to which the distribution of federal research
and development funds deviates from economic efficiency norms as a result
of political competition. Our analysis indicates that these federal funds are
allocated across states in a manner to reward majority party constituents as
well as to help the majority party compete for additional congressional seats.
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