This note explores two very basic models of efficient provision of a public good
with
imperfections stemming from purely spatial costs. The costs are treated as
costs of transmission or benefit reduction effects which are a positive function
of distance from a public good facility. The conditions for the efficient level
of public goods supply and the efficient number of facilities are derived and
discussed.
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