In this paper we present a point voting system with declining weights on votes Abstract for the representation of spillover interests among governments in a federalist
system. In theory our model represents a formalization in terms of voting of
Musgrave's proposal of varying benefit taxes to solve the problems caused by
intergovernmental spillovers. We apply the voting system to a case of benefit
incidence that tapers off spatially from a point of supply, although the principle
involved can be generally applied to the whole range of benefit and cost spillover activities on expenditure items among governments on the same or differ ent levels. An important conclusion of our analysis is that there should ration
ally be two-way representation and regional partial voting rights in the theory
and practice of fiscal federalism.
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