Demand function for public goods has conventionally been specified with the Abstract Walrasian type. In this study, it is argued thatforpublicgoods, demand should
be more properly specified with a Marshallian- type function in which tax share
is a function of the quantity demanded of public goods. First, theoretical
reasoning why the demand function for public goods must be of the Marshallian type is discussed, and the demandfunction of this specification is developed
and estimated to evaluate its merits.
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