The purpose of this review is to consolidate the analytical basis and reduce the technical complexity of the growing literature on congestion. Money and time costs are kept distinct, and the basic positive and normative implications of congestion are derived geometrically. On the assumptions that the “size” of the facility is fixed and that an uncongested alternative exists, the implications are derived for one and two classes of identical users entering under various means: with free access, efficiently, with private ownership, and through clubs.
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