This paper compares tax reductions and transfers as methods of redistribution in a public choice setting. It shows that tax reductions, by altering the set of tax prices confronting voters, can have unexpected effects on the political determination of nonredistributive expenditure policies. These effects can be avoided if transfers rather than tax reductions are used to redistribute income.
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