The purpose of this paper is to consider the effects of an efficient charge scheme on the generation of production externalities in the context of a two-firm model. The model suggests that, in the absence of such charges, firms are likely to select new technologies which increase residual generation. Thus, Pigouvian taxes are one means to provide the signals which the market cannot.
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