A previously presented charge scheme for public investments is derived
here from a set of axioms. It is argued that these axioms embody a
definition of equity in allocating the costs of a public facility and could
serve as a constitution which would be agreed on by users of a public
facility. Consideration is also given to optimality properties of the charge
scheme in encouraging the formation of coalitions to undertake joint
investments.
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