The authors use the proposition that it is the size of the net gains from a change to the volunteer army that determines its probability to describe circumstances which unambiguously increase the probability of a policy change. Certain events which intuitively seem to imply a greater probability of a volunteer army are shown to have ambiguous implications for such a policy change.
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