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Abstract

Do natural disasters change budget allocations in county government? Drawing on punctuated equilibrium theory and Peterson's (1981) typology of government programs, we test whether counties with greater disaster damage increase their developmental spending relative to redistributive and allocational spending. Data from Florida's 67 counties from 2005 to 2022 reveal that governments tend to increase developmental expenditures in the second year post-disaster and reduce allocational and redistributive expenditures. The pattern holds until year four, after which governments return to pre-disaster allocations. The traditional commission form of government attenuates the effect of disaster damage on developmental spending, whereas having a home rule charter has only a modest influence in the immediate aftermath of disasters. The level of federal aid also conditions the effect of disaster experience on local governments’ allocation decisions shortly after a disaster, but not in the longer run.

Keywords

disaster damage commission form of government home rule charter FEMA assistance seemingly unrelated regression

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Disaster Experience and Budget Allocation: Insights from Florida Counties

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