Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of fiscal decentralization on public finance performance for two levels of government on a panel of 33 developing economies from 2000 to 2020. Using the bias-corrected Least Square Dummy Variable estimator (LSDVC), we demonstrate that fiscal decentralization could enhance fiscal performance. The main findings are as follows: First, a larger share of decentralized expenditure is associated with a stronger central fiscal balance, but this effect diminishes with increased vertical fiscal imbalances (transfer dependency of subnational governments). The findings also show that vertical fiscal imbalances and revenue decentralization undermine fiscal positions at the central government level. At the sub-national level, we find a U-shaped relation between revenue autonomy (measured as the sub-national governments’ share of tax revenues) and sub-national budget deficits. Nonetheless, deficits of sub-national governments can be avoided through increased local accountability, for example, by having regional governments’ executive and legislative officials locally elected.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
