This article uniquely examines the drivers of government impersonation across US states. Government impersonation is a relatively new white-collar crime that is slowly being recognized by policy makers and largely ignored by researchers. Results show that it is the decentralized government structure, rather than government size, that significantly affects government impersonation. Greater diffusion of the Internet and economic freedom also contribute to impersonation fraud, while urbanization has a mitigating effect. The share of elderly residents, democratic governorships, or the distance of a state from the nation’s capital did not appreciably impact government impersonation but impacted overall fraud. Interestingly, greater enforcement employment results in more fraud coming to light. Some of the factors impacting government impersonation fraud differ from those affecting overall fraud. Therefore, blanket policies to combat overall fraud would not necessarily be effective in checking government impersonation.
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