This article investigates the relation between state tax amnesties and financial reporting irregularities. State tax amnesty programs, which potentially signal a lax regulatory enforcement environment, provide a unique setting in which to examine the effects of state tax authorities on non-tax financial reporting behavior. The results suggest that firms headquartered in states offering a tax amnesty program are more likely to begin engaging in a financial reporting irregularity during the amnesty period. Furthermore, the results show that the observed increase in financial reporting irregularities occurs only during periods of repeat, not initial, amnesty programs. These findings suggest state tax amnesties have previously unexplored adverse effects on managers’ behavior.
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