Feedback Information and Contributions to Not-for-Profit Enterprises: Experimental Investigations and Implications for Large-Scale Fund-Raising

Abstract

Not-for-profit enterprises often rely on donors for operating funds. Through fund-raising campaigns, individual donations are solicited, and the successes of fund-raising campaigns depend on various features of the campaign. In this article, the authors use experimental methods to investigate the effects of different types of feedback information during fund-raising campaigns. The basic setting is a linear public good. The major finding is that the nature of information has an impact on individual (and total) contributions and that these effects are systematic. The “optimal” campaign includes information on the relative sizes of received contributions and also offers a suggested level of contributions.

Keywords

voluntary contributions not-for-profit funding laboratory experiments

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