Countries that are rich in social capital, defined as the social and political institutions that stimulate interpersonal trust, civic cooperation, and social cohesiveness, tend to have more efficient governments, have better governance systems, and grow faster. This article provides preliminary cross-country evidence for a sample of developing and developed countries that fiscal decentralization—the assignment of expenditure functions and revenue sources to lower levels of government—can boost social capital.
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