Scalpers, as market specialists, may improve ticket-producing firms’ revenues, and the ticket market, when scalpers are relatively limited in number. Thus, both scalpers and firms may have a joint interest in public “scalper regulation” that enhances joint market power. Other market participants may also benefit from a more orderly market.
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