This study tests for fiscal interdependence in the provision of a local public good—libraries in Los Angeles County. The authors present evidence that the reaction of libraries to fiscal externalities is dependent on the level of government producing the good. The authors find that the city-run libraries respond to neighboring output but the county system largely does not.
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