This article examines the theory of fiscal illusion, showing that after the international attention received, thanks to James M. Buchanan, it deserves some further reflections. In particular, this article emphasizes the general nature of the fiscal illusion processes, which can be found not only in totalitarian but also in democratic systems. At the end, the suggestion is made to remove (or at least minimize) the effects of the illusion processes and to make stable the fiscal system according to the Buchanan’s fiscal constitutional proposal.
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