This article presents an analysis of the determinants of money and time donations to Spanish nongovernmental organizations that channel aid to less developed countries. A basic model inspired by the theory of monopolistic competition is formulated and tested taking into account that some of the explanatory variables, such as fund-raising expenditure and price, are endogenous. The results show that the average donor is different for money and time donations and that government preferences differ from those of private donors. Finally, the authors find that the hypothesis of efficient fund-raising expenditures cannot be rejected.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Andreoni, J.1990. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. Economic Journal100:464-477.
2.
Ben-Ner, A.1986. Nonprofit organizations: Why do they exist in market economies? In The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and policy, edited by S. Rose-Ackerman. New York: Oxford University Press.
3.
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian. 1986. On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics29:25-49.
4.
Brown, E., and H. Lankford. 1992. Gifts of money and gifts of time: Estimating effects of tax prices and available time. Journal of Public Economics47:321-341.
5.
Callen, J. L.1994. Money donations, volunteering and organizational efficiency. Journal of Productivity Analysis5:215-228.
6.
Coordinadora de ONGD, Directorio ONGD. 1994. (Coordinadora de Organizaciones no Gubernamentales de Cooperación para el Desarrollo, Madrid). Document. Madrid: Coordinadora de ONGD, Directorio ONGD.
7.
Cornes, R., and T. Sandler. 1984. Easy riders, joint production and public goods. Economic Journal94:580-598.
8.
Dixit, A., and J. Stiglitz. 1977. Monopolist competition and optimum product diversity. American Economic Review67:297-308.
9.
Khana, J., J. Posnett, and T. Sandler. 1995. Charity donations in the UK: New evidence based on panel data. Journal of Public Economics56:257-272.
10.
Khana, J., and T. Sandler. 2000. Partners in giving: The crowding-in effects of UK government grants. European Economic Review44:1543-1556.
11.
Krashinsky, M.1986. Transaction costs and theory of the nonprofit organization. In The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and policy, edited by S. Rose-Ackerman. New York: Oxford University Press.
12.
Ley, E.1996. On the private provision of public goods: A diagrammatic exposition. Investigaciones Económicas20:105-123.
13.
Okten, C., and B. A. Weisbrod. 2000. Determinants of donations in private nonprofit markets. Journal of Public Economics75:255-272.
14.
Posnett, J., and T. Sandler. 1989. Demand for charity donations in private non-profit markets. Journal of Public Economics40:187-200.
15.
Rose-Ackerman, S.1996. Altruism, nonprofits, and economics. Journal of Economic Literature34:701-728.
16.
Salamon, L., and H. Anheier. 1999. Global civil society: Dimensions of the nonprofit sector. Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
17.
Steinberg, R.1986. The revelated objective functions of nonprofits firms. Rand Journal of Economics17:508-526.
18.
Steinberg, R.1991. Does government spending crowd-out donations? Interpreting the evidence. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics3:591-617.
19.
Weisbrod, B. A., and N. D. Domínguez. 1986. Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behaviour?Journal of Public Economics30:83-95.
20.
Zavala Matulic, L. O. 1994. Las ONGD en España. Origen y evolución. In Directorio ONGD 1994 (Coordinadora de ONG de Cooperación para el Desarrollo), 215-24.
