This is a proposal to make persons and their lives central to and the primary focus of psychological theory and inquiry. To this end, the ontological status of persons is clarified, their unique ontogeny is described, and the nature of their lives is explored. With these clarifications and descriptions in place, the proposal concludes with a consideration of advantages to psychology and psychologists of adopting persons and their lives as a primary focus of psychological theory and inquiry.
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