The asymmetric relationship between governments and vendors makes a public-private partnership difficult to achieve, according to principal-agent theory, because vendors have more opportunities to shirk their contracted duties than governments can control. The experience of the Orlando Orange County Expressway Authority illustrates how the use of incentives helps achieve partnerships.
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