Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) imposed on state and local governments is a popular policy approach to limit the growth in government. At the same time these limits may hinder the ability of state and local governments to provide services and make investments in public infrastructure. We test the relationship between state-level TEL restrictiveness and the United State’s network of highway bridges. We generally find that more restrictive TELs have a weak negative impact on the percentage of bridges deemed structurally deficient but a positive impact on the percentage of bridges deemed functionally obsolete. The states with the most restrictive TELs, those that restrict both revenues and expenditures, tend to have a smaller share of their bridges that are either structurally deficient of functionally obsolete.
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