Three challenges affect the use of initiatives and referendums concerning bonds to fund local infrastructure. First, public officials can often make take-it-or-leave-it offers to voters, conferring substantial power on the agenda setters and not necessarily leading to policy that the voters prefer. Second, initiatives are subject to sequential-elimination agendas that can result in suboptimal policy. This problem is compounded in local direct democracy by the presence of multiple jurisdictions and an aggregate limit on bond capacity, leading to a “race to the polls.” Third, in some but not all cases, voters can be faced with an information environment that precludes making reasoned decisions at the polls. The authors assess several case studies to determine whether trustworthy voting cues are available to voters in elections on infrastructure bonds.
Austin City Connection, Office of the City Clerk. (n.d.). Election history. Retrieved May 2, 2008, from http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/election/search.cfm
2.
Baldassare, M. (2004). PPIC statewide survey: Californians and their government. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
3.
Baum, M., & Groeling, T. (2007). Crossing the water's edge: Elite rhetoric, media coverage and the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon (KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-013) . Unpublished.
4.
Besley, T.J. & Coate, S. (2000). Issue unbundling via citizens'initiatives (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 8036). Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://www.nber.org/papers/w8036.
5.
Boudreau, C., Lupia, A., McCubbins, M.D., & Rodriguez, D.B. (2007). What statutes mean: Interpretive lessons from positive theories of communication and legislation. San Diego Law Review, 44, 957-992.
6.
Boudreau, C., & McCubbins, M.D. (2007, June 28). From competition to competence? Theory and experiments regarding deliberation, expertise and decision making. Social Science Research Network. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://ssrn.com/abstract=997199
7.
Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (1998). Demanding choices: Opinion, voting and direct democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
8.
Bowler, S.,Donovan, T., & Tolbert, C. J. (Eds.) (1998). Citizens as legislators: Direct democracy in the United States. Columbus: Ohio State University.
9.
Brown, K. (1991). Guidelines for Mello-Roos financing. Sacramento: California Debt Advisory Commission.
10.
Cabanatuan, M. (2008, January 10). Backers now urge voting against Prop. 91. San Francisco Chronicle, p. B-1. Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/01/10/BAE2UC4G6.DTL
11.
California Healthcare Foundation. (2003). Emergency departments in the health care system: Use of services in California counties. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://www.chcf.org/documents/hospitals/EmergDeptCountyLevel.pdf
12.
Calvert, R.L. (1985). The value of biased information: A rational choice model of political advice. Journal of Politics, 47, 530-555.
13.
Chung, L.A. (1992, November 1). San Francisco ballot propositions . San Francisco Chronicle, p. 15/Z1.
14.
Citrin, J., & Cohen, J. (2006). Viewing the recall from above and below. In S. Bowler & B. E. Cain (Eds.), Clicker politics: Essays on the California recall 68 (pp. 74-82). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
15.
City and County of San Francisco. (2008). Municipal elections code (Article V: Election material mailed to the voters, Sections 500-595). Retrieved from http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14137&sid=5
16.
City of Los Angeles. (2006). Election code (Chap. IV: Art. B, Voter information pamphlet; Section 402, Contents of the voter information pamphlet). Retrieved May 2, 2008, from http://www.lacity.org/clk/urldoc2832.pdf .
17.
City of San Diego.San Diego municipal code (Chap. 2, Government; Art. 7, Elections, campaign finance and lobbying; Division 5, Ballots and measures). Retrieved May 2, 2008, from http://docs.sandiego.gov/municode/MuniCodeChapter02/Ch02Art07Division29.pdf.
18.
Druckman, J.N. (2001). On the limits of framing effects: Who can frame ? Journal of Politics, 63, 1041-66.
19.
Erie, S.P. (2004). Globalizing L.A. trade, infrastructure, and religional development. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
20.
Federal Trade Commission. (2003). Deception in weight-loss advertising workshop: Seizing opportunities and building partnerships to stop weight-loss fraud (staff report). Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/12/031209weightlossrpt.pdf
21.
Fiorina, M. (1982). Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process. Public Choice39, 33-66.
22.
Garrett, E. (2005). Hybrid democracy. George Washington Law Review, 73, 1096-1130.
23.
Garrett, E., & McCubbins, M.D. (2007). The dual path initiative framework. Southern California Law Review, 80, 299-345.
24.
Garrett, E., & Smith, D.A. (2005). Veiled political actors and campaign disclosure laws in direct democracy. Election Law Journal, 4, 295-328.
25.
Gerber, E.R. (1999). The populist paradox: Interest group influence and the promise of direct legislation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
26.
Gerber, E.R., Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M.D. (2004). When does government limit the impact of voter initiatives? The politics of implementation and enforcement . Journal of Politics, 66, 43-68.
27.
Gillette, C.P. (2005). Voting with your hands: Direct democracy in annexation . Southern California Law Review, 78, 835-68.
28.
Gordon, T.M. (2004). The local initiative in California. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California .
29.
Hajnal, Z.L., & Lewis, P.G. (2003). Municipal institutions and voter turnout in local elections. Urban Affairs Review, 38, 645-68.
30.
Hasen, R.L. (2000). Parties take the initiative (and vice versa). Columbia Law Review, 100, 731-52.
31.
Kiewiet, D.R., & Szakaly, K. (1996). Constitutional limitations on borrowing: An analysis of state bonded indebtednesss. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 12, 62-97.
32.
Kousser, T., & McCubbins, M.D. (2005). Social choice, crypto-initiatives and policy making by direct democracy. Southern California Law Review, 78, 949-984.
33.
Lupia, A. (1994). Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: Information and voting behavior in California insurance reform elections. American Political Science Review, 88, 63-76.
34.
Lupia, A., & Matsusaka, J.G. (2004). Direct democracy: New approaches to old questions. Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 463-482.
35.
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M.D. (1998). The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn what they need to know?Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
36.
Matsusaka, J.G. (2004) For the many or the few: The initiative, public policy, and American democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
37.
Matsusaka, J.G., & McCarty, N.M. (2001). Political resource allocation: benefits and costs of voter initiatives. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization , 17, 413-448.
38.
McCubbins, M.D. (1995). Putting the state back into state government: The constitution and the budget. In B. Cain & R. Nolls (Eds.) Constitutional reform in California: Making state government more effective and responsive (p. 353-75). Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, University of California Institute for Governmental Studies.
39.
Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982.California Government Code, (2008). Section 53311, 53318-53329.5.
40.
Noll, R. G., & Cain, B. E. (Eds.). (1995). Principles of state constitutional design. In Constitutional reform in California (pp. 9-31). Berkeley : University of California at Berkeley, University of California Institute for Governmental Studies.
41.
Office of Statewide Health Planning & Development. (1999-2000). Hospital financial data disclosure report. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://www.oshpd.cahwnet.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/forms/index.html
42.
Oliver, J.E., & Ha, S.E. (2006). Vote choice in suburban elections. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Academic/workshops/ampolpapers/Oliver_Workshop.pdf
43.
Ordeshook, P.C., & Schwartz, T. (1987). Agenda and the control of political outcomes. American Political Science Review, 81, 179-99.
44.
Pellerin, G.L. (2005, July 27). Statement of vote for the July 26, 2005 special election submitted to the Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors. Retrieved May 2, 2008, from http://sccounty01.co.santacruz.ca.us/bds/GovStream/BDSvData/non_legacy/Minutes/2005/20050802/PDF/018-1.pdf
45.
Port bonds in doubt on close vote. (1935, November 27). Los Angeles Times, p. 1.
46.
Port bonds win favor. (1935, November 22). Los Angeles Times, p. A2.
47.
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice, 33, 27-43.
48.
Rueben, K.S., & Cerdan, P. (2003). Fiscal effects of voter approval requirements on local governments. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
49.
Schwartz, T. (1987). Votes, strategies and institutions: An introduction to the theory of collective choice. In M. D. McCubbins & T. Sullivan (Eds.), Congress: Structure and policy (p. 318-45). New York: Cambridge University Press.
50.
Sisson, P. (2006a, June 2).Tri-City's Proposition F campaign nears the $1 million mark. North County Times. Retrieved from http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/01/30/news/coastal/3_03_991_29_08.txt
51.
Sisson, P. (2006b, June 24). Tri-City's Proposition F failed for myriad of reasons. North County Times. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2006/06/25/news/coastal/20_11_276_24_06.txt
52.
Sisson, P. (2008, January 29) Tri-City eyes Shadowridge annexation . North County Times. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/01/30/news/coastal/3_03_991_29_08.txt
53.
Voters to pass on power issue. (1923, May 15). Los Angeles Times, p. 1114.
