Abstract
Governmental crises may become reality when Presidential orders are not implemented by the bureaucracy. Through formal delegation and informal power, the bureaucracy can stall, ignore or delay orders mandated by the ex ecutive, despite the widespread notion that the American Presidency possesses great potency. During national emergencies, the chief executive must not only implement solutions, but must arbitrate between agency officials more con cerned with enacting personal policies than following executive directives. Fragmentation between the technical and administrative components of the public sector may result in disasters such as nuclear reactor accidents. Struggles to implement preferred policy within a Presidential administration may result in greater calamities; the aggravation of tensions between nations, and, possi bly, a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Since the end of the Second World War, Presidents have been faced with this scenario on several occasions.
Through alliances with other branches, the civil service can establish hear ings which can not only slow Presidential orders, but also muster public sup port for the bureaucracy's cause. Agency chiefs, cognizant that more resources create more powerful organizations, devise clever strategies to expand budgets, even when the chief executive mandates cutbacks. Local agency leaders have even initiated litigation to regain funding impounded under deficit reduction legislation.
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