Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Empirical and theoretical research on government competition and collaboration identifies several important macro-level characteristics that can affect these forms of interaction between local governments within the same large jurisdiction. These characteristics are fragmentation of governments, fiscal dispersion of governments, sorting of population by governments, and decentralized fiscal responsibility between state and local governments. This study presents indices to measure these characteristics and examines how metropolitan regions in the United States with populations greater than one million are distributed on these indices. The study also examines how these regions compare on conditions that are likely to motivate sales tax competition between municipal governments.

Keywords

fragmentation local government metropolitan regions macro-level conditions state–local relations

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Research. 1988. Metropolitan Organization: The St. Louis Case, M158. Washington, DC: ACIR.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Research. 1993. Metropolitan Organization: Comparison of the Allegheny and St. Louis Case Studies. SR-15m. Washington, DC: ACIR.

Amirkhanyan

A. A.

2009. “Collaborative Performance Measurement: Examining and Explaining the Prevalence of Collaboration in State and Local Government Contracts.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 19 (3): 523–54.

Basolo

2003. “US Regionalism and Rationality.” Urban Studies 40 (3): 447–62.

Berry

2008. “Piling On: Multilevel Government and The Fiscal Common-Pool.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 802–20.

Boyne

G. A.

1992. “Local Government Structure and Performance: Lessons from America.” Public Administration 70 (3): 333–57.

Boyne

G. A.

1996. “Competition and Local Government: A Public Choice Perspective.” Urban Studies 33 (4–5): 703–21.

Brennan

Buchanan

J. M.

1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Breton

1995. Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

10.

Campbell

R. J.

2004. “Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion in Local Government Overlapping Jurisdictions.” Public Choice 120 (3–4): 301–29.

11.

Carruthers

J. I.

Ulfarsson

G. F.

2002. “Fragmentation and Sprawl: Evidence from Interregional Analysis.” Growth and Change 33 (3): 312–40.

12.

The Committee on Finance and Tax. 2006. State Revenues Shared with Local Governments: A State-by-State Comparison, Report Number 2007-123 Prepared for The Florida Senate, October: http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2007/Senate/reports/interim_reports/pdf/2007-123ftlong.pdf

13.

Dolan

D. A.

1990. “Local Government Fragmentation—Does It Drive Up the Cost of Government.” Urban Affairs Quarterly 26 (1): 28–45.

14.

Dowding

John

Biggs

1994. “Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature.” Urban Studies 31 (4–5): 767–97.

15.

Downs

1994. New Vision for Metropolitan America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

16.

Feiock

R. C.

2002. “A Quasi Market for Local Government Economic Development Competition.” Journal of Urban Affairs 24 (2): 123–42.

17.

Feiock

R. C.

2009. “Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Collective Action.” Urban Affairs Review 44 (3): 356–77.

18.

Feiock

R. C.

Lee

I. W.

Park

H. J.

Lee

K. H.

2010. “Collaboration Networks Among Local Elected Officials: Information, Commitment, and Risk Aversion.” Urban Affairs Review 46 (2): 241–62.

19.

Feiock

R. C.

Steinacker

Park

H. J.

2009. “Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures.” Public Administration Review 69 (2): 256–70.

20.

Hamilton

D. K.

Miller

D. Y.

Paytas

2004. “Exploring the Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of the Governing of Metropolitan Regions.” Urban Affairs Review 40 (2): 147–82.

21.

Hendrick

Jimenez

Lal

2011. “Does Local Government Fragmentation Increase Local Spending?” Urban Affairs Review 47 (4): 487–510.

22.

Hendrick

Jacob

2007. “Tax Competition Among Municipal Governments: Exit vs. Voice.” Urban Affairs Review 43 (2): 221–55.

23.

Howell-Moroney

2008. “The Tiebout Hypothesis 50 Years Later: Lessons and Lingering Challenges for Metropolitan Governance in the 21st Century.” Public Administration Review 68 (1): 97–109.

24.

Lewis

P. G.

1996. Shaping Suburbia: How Political Institutions Organize Urban Development. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.

25.

Lowery

2000. “A Transaction Costs Model of Metropolitan Governance: Allocation vs. Redistribution in Urban America.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10 (1): 49–78.

26.

Lewis

P. G.

Barbour

1999. California Cities and the Local Sales Tax. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

27.

Lubell

Schneider

Scholz

J. T.

Mete

2002. “Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (1): 148–63.

28.

Miller

D. Y.

2002. The Regional Governing of Metropolitan, America. Boulder: Westview Press.

29.

Miller

D. Y.

Lee

J. H.

2009. “Making Sense of Metropolitan Regions: A Dimensional Approach to Regional Governance.” Publius 41 (1): 126–45.

30.

Musso

J. A.

1998. “Fiscal Federalism as a Framework for Governance.” In Handbook of Public Finance, edited by Thompson

Green

, 347–96. New York: Marcel Dekker.

31.

Oates

2005. “Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism.” International Tax and Public Finance 12:349–74.

32.

Pack

1977. “Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban Homogeneity.” Urban Studies 14 (2): 191–201.

33.

Parks

R. B.

Oakerson

R. J.

1993. “Comparative Metropolitan Organization and Governance Structures in St. Louis and Allegheny County.” Publius 23 (1): 21–30.

34.

Peterson

1981. City Limits. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

35.

Rork, Jonathan

2003. “Coveting Thy Neighbors’ Taxation.” National Tax Journal 56 (4): 775–87.

36.

Schneider

1989. “Intermunicipal Competition, Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrats, and the Level of Suburban Competition.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (3): 612–29.

37.

Sjoquist

D. L.

Walker

M. B.

Wallace

2005. “Estimating Differential Responses to Local Fiscal Conditions: A Mixture Model Analysis.” Public Finance Review 33 (1): 36–61.

38.

Stansel

2006. “Interjurisdictional Competition and Local Government Spending in U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Public Finance Review 34 (2): 173–94.

39.

Stein

R. M.

1987. “Tiebout’s Sorting Hypothesis.” Urban Affairs Quarterly 23 (1): 140–60.

40.

Stephens

G. R.

1974. “State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy.” Journal of Politics 36 (1): 44–76.

41.

Stephens

G. R.

Wikstrom

2000. Metropolitan Government and Governance: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Analysis, and the Future. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

42.

Tiebout

C. M.

1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure.” Journal of Political Economy 64:416–24.

43.

U.S. Census of Governments. 2007. Available from http://www.census.gov/govs/cog/historical_data_2007.html

44.

Weiher

G. R.

1991. The Fractured Metropolis: Political Fragmentation and Metropolitan Segregation. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press.

45.

Yeung

2009. “The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size of Government: A Meta-analysis.” Public Budgeting and Finance 29 (4): 1.23.

46.

Zimmerman

1995. State-Local Relations: A Partnership Approach. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.06 MB

Macro-Level Determinants of Local Government Interaction

Abstract

Keywords

Get full access to this article

References

Supplementary Material