Abstract
In this article the interaction and cooperation of local level actors is conceived as being premised on two organizational logics, that is, on the territorialitybased general purpose elected local government form and on institutionalized functionality-based single-purpose non-elected intermunicipal cooperation. Drawing on the work by Hooghe and Marks the two variants are identified as “type I” and “type II” institutional arrangements. Germany and France are treated as comparative cases in point.In Germany the institutional development resulted, with federalism-typical variance between the Länder, in a mono structure of type I local government in some and in a dual structure with type II intermunicipal bodies in others, whereas in France the dual structure with a multitude of type II intermuncipal bodies (intercommunalité) has prevailed. Recently a new wave of territorial reforms in East German Länder has extended the coverage of type I local government and reduced that of type II intermunicipal bodies, while in France the introduction of the type II communautés bears traces of the type I local government form. In both countries these reform moves have been triggered largely by mounting criticism of the operational (conflict and transaction) costs and democratic deficits of the dual structure with type II intermuncipal bodies. These advances of the type I local government form concur with local level territorial reforms put into effect in a growing number of other European countries. Finally the article interprets the findings by drawing on and applying the conceptual government/governance scheme.
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