The authors develop an institutional choice framework to examine and interpret change in local boundaries and provide a single explanation for the use of varied instruments to create new boundaries or expand old ones. Boundary decisions are viewed as the product of actors’ seeking particular outcomes within a context of existing governments and established rules governing boundary change. Selective costs and benefits, rather than collective costs and benefits, are most likely to provide incentives for institutional entrepreneurship and collective action. Such a framework is valuable because it integrates the fragmented literatures on local boundaries, provides a linkage between boundary choices and policy outcomes at the local level, and can guide empirical research into the causes and consequences of boundary change. This framework can provide the foundation of a more general model of institutional choice and institutional entrepreneurship.
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