The Meaning of Essences

Abstract

As long as there has been phenomenological empirical research, the relationship to the philosophical foundation has been a matter of dispute. One such example we find in a recent publication, where Byrne accuses us of misreading Husserl and his idea of essences. We hold that our reading of Husserl is accurate. We agree that phenomenological research is not simply about practicing phenomenological philosophical concepts, and we also argue how important it is to translate and interpret the philosophical ideas to inform empirical research. We also believe that this is what we do when we emphasize how important it is to appraise demands from the scientific community. In our response, we explain our approach to phenomenological research, with an emphasis on how to work with meaning analysis, including essential as well as individual meanings.

The Meaning of Essences – A Response to Byrne on the Relationship Between Phenomenological Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

The phenomenological philosophy is such a rich source of knowledge that it distinguishes phenomenological empirical research from other qualitative approaches. The ontology and epistemology by influential philosophers of phenomenology, such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and Heidegger have is a fortune for all scientifically interested researchers. Together with the continental existential theory and practice of scholars such as Boss and Jaspers, they constitute an exclusive knowledge base for the development of phenomenological empirical research as well as for understanding, for example, health and well-being (Zahavi, 2019a).

Phenomenological philosophy is complex, sophisticated, and not easy to interpret; this has led to many debates among researchers about its utility for empirical research. In addition, and as a part of this dispute, philosophers have not only professed the uniqueness of phenomenological philosophy, but also strongly maintain that it is first and foremost the domain of and belongs to philosophers, and that they have priority and the right to enquire into and articulate its meanings. Some have even explicitly called for researchers conducting empirically based investigations to abstain from using phenomenological philosophy altogether (Paley, 2017). Often, researchers within the health care area have been the target.

It is against this short sketch of a background that the recent critique by Byrne (2025) should be encountered and understood. In his article, we detect a discernable annoyance against empirical researchers who examine and use phenomenological philosophy. Although we understand and agree with some of the arguments in the paper, we strongly disagree with his critique of our approach to the analysis of empirical data and our presumed misreading of Husserl. But before going into that subject matter, we need to say something about our understanding of phenomenological philosophy when applying it to empirical research.

We will argue that it is essential to understand that the judgment of how the philosophy is best interpreted and practiced not only is a question of how to understand the philosophy per se. The question is also to understand how all qualitative research is negatively impacted because of, what we contend, is the unevenly weighted scientific paradigm that is dominated by quantitative research. Both phenomenological philosophy and scientific practice set up the rules for how phenomenological research is best understood, developed, and permitted to flourish.

The Need for Philosophy of Science

From our many years of effort and experiences within academia, as researchers as well as teachers, advisers and reviewers, we have noticed weaknesses in both phenomenological research and qualitative research in general. We have frequently observed unfortunate examples of investigators utilizing unreflective and rigidly structured research procedures, as well as those who avoid meaning-oriented methods in favor of superficial content analysis approaches (H. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2019, H. Dahlberg et al., 2024). We have also revealed how researchers can go wrong when they struggle to obtain evidence‑based results in qualitative research (van Wijngaarden et al., 2017). As a consequence of these and other noted issues, qualitative research is often judged as less scientific; it may be seen as a type of anecdotal and journalistic evidence that is not scientific research per se and therefore less important.

As per the accepted hierarchy of evidence, most mainstream science and research is quantitative in nature, with meta-analyses, and randomized controlled trials ranked the highest. Natural science and mathematics are the foundation for this type of research. Historically, especially in medicine, psychology, and other health-related areas, qualitative research has been generally categorized as low in scientific value, and as an idiographic and anecdotal practice. Because these areas of inquiry are characterized by often deep existential meaning and because many human health issues are not comprehensively measurable by only quantitative methodology, this is problematic. Still, researchers often use the technique of operationalization to meet the golden rule of science, and as a result, even unmeasurable phenomena are investigated and reported on using numbers and statistics.

Although some investigators are aware of this epistemological dilemma and choose qualitative approaches, they may find themselves in an unfortunate situation: operating within scientific communities that are characterized by a reductionist stance and that are missing the employment of philosophy of science. In these circumstances, there is no easy access to ontology, epistemology or methodology, and it is easy to go qualitative by quantitative rules. In a recent publication, we state:

Modern science has seduced us to believe that there is a solid road to find the one and only truth, that complete knowledge is possible, and if abiding to the right methods, we will be completely enlightened. Paraphrasing Merleau‑Ponty, we argue that this is a delusion. Our human existence is multifaceted and rich in meaning. Human relationships, suffering, love, sorrow, anger, learning, health, illness, life power and meaning – the list is endless, but here are examples of existential aspects that cannot be understood or explained by research ruled by dualism or reductionism, by prefigured step‑by‑step methods, or by numbers. Instead, there is the need for research that bridges contradictions and embraces ambiguity, diversity and inconsistency in favor of meaning (K. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2026, pp. 9–10).

Without a philosophical underpinning that forms the basis of scientific inquiry, researchers can lose themselves in a type of scientific confusion, which can be very difficult to navigate. Every researcher, and it is especially true for those working with qualitative approaches, needs to know about the philosophy of science to grasp the dominance of the quantitative scientific paradigm over that of qualitative research. The value and worth of qualitative research, we argue, is dependent upon integrating the foundation of phenomenological philosophy of science into investigative undertakings.

The Need for Phenomenological Philosophy of Science

From our own experience and knowledge within this field of inquiry, we assert that a phenomenological philosophy of science supports the rigorous practice of qualitative research, and of phenomenological research in particular. Phenomenological ontology lays a foundation of how to understand human existence, and epistemology, together with methodology, support suitable choices and the use of methods. We thus maintain that it is critical that researchers are familiar with phenomenological philosophy, so that they (a) have the insight needed into how phenomenological philosophy is constructed, (b) understand what the ideas and concepts mean, and (c) recognize how these ideas and concepts relate to each other. In addition, it is of utmost importance that practitioners of phenomenological research need to understand the ideas and concepts that are used in this research, such as the lifeworld and its constituents.

Phenomenology plays an essential role in the philosophy of science. Compared with all other qualitative approaches, phenomenological research approaches alone emerge from such a rich well of ontology, epistemology and methodology. Phenomenological philosophy of science has the power to inform empirical research because it is phenomenon-oriented (instead of following step-by-step procedures. In addition, it encourages the researcher to carefully choose from all possible methods to generate data, and to also carefully choose from several types of analysis (instead of advocating for just one method). Importantly, as well, is that it allows for having an open-minded approach to existence and meaning (K. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2026; K. Dahlberg, Dahlberg, et al., 2008).

As we have discussed above, qualitative investigators historically have had to defend their research as scientifically valid, and here is where phenomenology is exclusive. Every decision made in phenomenological research supports scientific requirements and informs researchers. The idea of essences has an important place in this discussion, and we will address this further in our response, but first, some notes on another, similar issue.

All through our practice of phenomenological research, including our thorough efforts to develop an ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically solid approach, we have been aware of how the epoché is essential to Husserl’s philosophy. In our work, it has been of great value to understand even such a dense philosophical idea, even if we never have aimed at integrating it into empirical research. For example, we write:

For Husserl (1913/1998), the break with the natural attitude, proposing the idea of the epoché, is, in short, “to avoid simply presupposing realism.” (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 108) With the epoché, a special form of “indubitability” is put in brackets⁶ (Husserl, 1913/1998). The aim of such an operation is to “liberate us from our natural(istic) dogmatism,” but maintaining such ideas in empirical research, it must be emphasized that the aim is “not to doubt, ignore, abandon, or exclude reality” from research (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 108). The epoché is central to the Husserlian understanding and description of phenomenological philosophy. As such, it is likewise of particular significance when we want to grasp the meaning of other central concepts such as lifeworld, intentionality and meaning, which come to use in empirical practice. Husserl’s analysis of the possibility of an epoché forms an intellectual background to, and has an impact on, how we can understand the application of phenomenology in empirical research. Even though the epoché is not necessary in the practice of empirical research, it is not without value. (K. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2026, pp. 2–3)

This quote illustrates our great appreciation of Husserl’s philosophy, a philosophy that we regard as a truly foundation for science and research. We appreciate Husserl’s (1928/1989, 1948/1973) exceptional analysis of the lived body, as well as his profound descriptions of the interplay between humans and the world. His analysis of all layers of perception and co-perception that happen in between humans and world shows how invaluable he is to phenomenological research. We are also impressed by the impact these ideas have had on Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968, 1961/1989, 1948/2004, 1945/2006), whose philosophy constitute a main part of our philosophic understanding. His way of interpreting the Husserlian thinking and especially his discovery of the meaning of flesh (fr. chair) guides our ambition to develop a philosophical background to a scientifically strong phenomenological approach to empirical research. Here, we want to add that we have also been influenced by Gadamer’s (1960/1995) critique of “method” as well as his emphasis on scientific openness. Having said that, this is how we usually present our research approach:

Philosophical ideas and concepts are first and foremost meant for philosophical investigations and are often dense and elusive to non‑philosophers. Such significant knowledge cannot be extracted from its ordinary context and applied in a new area, different from the original one, without great concern. Our ambition is to preserve the ontological, epistemological and methodological depth in the presentation of the philosophical groundwork, and to pay attention to the ideas that are of particular value to describe a phenomenological research approach, with strong scientific potential and at the same time highly practical. //Phenomenology is built upon the philosophical idea that human experience is born from the world, directed to the world and must be understood with the world as background. The lifeworld approach manifests the relationship between humans and the world, a connection that is already meaningful. This is an essential ontological and epistemological position from which we can create methodology that can be further developed into empirical research practice. (K. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2026, pp. 1; 10)

All through our practice within the phenomenological domain, we have advocated lifeworld as the central idea (cf. H. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2020; K. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2026; K. Dahlberg, Dahlberg, et al., 2008; H. Dahlberg et al., 2024; K. Dahlberg, Todres, et al., 2008). The phenomenological lifeworld theory, including knowledge of such concepts as perception, intentionality, corporeality, intercorporeality, temporality and spatiality, is the core of all our work, whether it is about empirical research in general or health care theory and practice specifically.

From our various practices, we have also found the need to explore other phenomenological ideas, such as bridling and essences. Let us emphasize that when exploring philosophical concepts, we are of course grounded in the original ideas but not just with the specific texts by the philosophers, but with their philosophy in general as a context for our analyses. We have described “bridling” and its importance in great detail in multiple publications on phenomenological research elsewhere (e.g., H. Dahlberg, 2022; H. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2020). We will now direct the focus of this paper to the analysis of data in phenomenological empirical research, in which we include the meaning of essences.

The Analysis of Empirical Data in Phenomenological Research

As we indicate above, our approach to the analysis of empirical data in phenomenological research has four main foundational sources: (a) the phenomenological philosophy as it is described by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer; (b) experiences from phenomenological research within a scientific community and the requirements of that community for research validity, objectivity and generalization; (c) experiences from many years of national and international teaching of qualitative, phenomenological research; and (d) international experiences from reviewing numerous research manuscripts in journals and multiple doctoral dissertations from PhD students from around the globe.

The way to describe our approach to analysis varies, due to research context, journal rules etc., but in a recent publication (H. Dahlberg et al., 2024) we describe the goal of phenomenological analysis:

The advantage of presenting a full structure of meaning is that the themes of meaning, instead of just being lined-up, they are now explicitly related to each other and bound together by the description of essential meanings. In such way, the study result more clearly defines the phenomenon. Another advantage is that with essential meanings, the results are easier to transform to other situations and contexts. (p. 6)

In that paper, we illustrate the analysis with excerpts from an empirical study, which shows the significance of exploring essential meanings.

To paraphrase ourselves from above, we accordingly hold that Husserl’s idea of essences forms an intellectual background to, and has an impact on, how we understand the application of phenomenological philosophy in research, and in the empirical analysis of data.

Now, we ask, how has this subject been understood by Byrne (2025)?

He first attaches us to “a trend,” one that we are completely unaware of. From the beginning of our work with phenomenological ideas and up to this day, we have prepared our own approach to phenomenological research. We have found a strength in being a team of one philosopher and one empirical researcher, the philosopher having lived experiences of empirical research, the researcher having lived experiences of philosophy. We have published extensively and gratefully listened to comments from colleagues and students, as well as having discussed many exciting issues at many conferences. Via incremental and carefully considered and tested insights, we have developed our own approach, entitled Reflective Lifeworld Research.

Byrne’s more substantial critique of our methodology is directed to what he proposes is our fault of “outlining” Husserl’s theory; he uses the following quote in his evaluation to describe and challenge how we continuously see essences:

We see essences continuously; i.e. when we experience the world, we see essences. . . . In order for me to see these phenomena I must, per se, in an immediate way grasp their essences. I cannot say that I see an apple tree or a horse without grasping the essence of these phenomena. (K. Dahlberg, 2006, p. 12)

We have no intention what so ever of outlining, or in any way summarizing, Husserl’s philosophy. That quote is not about the analysis of data.

Our description of what happens in the mundane “seeing of essences” is simply an attempt to overcome the sometimes large gap between complex philosophy and commonplace reality, and to show that even sophisticated philosophy has equivalence, function and purpose in our everyday lives. Not least, for us, as teachers, it has been an eye-opener to describe and explain to others how there are essences in play when we see another person, e.g., an oak or a horse, even if we do not think so, and how such co-perception increases understanding of the phenomenon. To include Husserl (1948/1973) in this description, we would like to refer the reader to his analysis of experience and judgment where he presents how we “see” a house although we can view only the front side of it. When viewing the front side, we “mean” it with all inner and outer horizons, and what we really see is a house. In other words, this is how we grasp the essential meaning of the house, with both its inner horizons, such as a front door, walls, rooms, ceilings and floors, together with more individual meanings such as a garden or flower beds.

We could, of course, also include thinking and judging in such an experience as well. For example, if we see something that we think may be a house, but we are unsure of it. Previous experiences may play a role in how we apprehend the house, or, perhaps a friend is standing nearby, and pointing and saying, “oh, this is such a nice house. Or there may be emotions tied to some houses for us and those emotions then have an impact on a present experience. In truth, there is so much more involved in the spontaneous understanding of something as something, when we embrace phenomena and their meaning in our everyday life. These aspects of intentionality are all included in our approach to the analysis of meaning.

However, we never say that this is what Husserl (1913/1998) is into in his precise analysis of essences. The philosophical seeing of essences – as well as including the understanding of essential meaning in empirical research analysis – is indeed accomplished by an intellectual activity of thinking and judging. But we still argue that the mundane seeing does not necessarily include such reasoning, which is our very point here.

In the second paper that Byrne critiques (H. Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2019), we aim at the same description, but must admit that we are somewhat unclear here. One explanation is that we have a particular focus in this paper, trying to overcome the unfortunate and common fight between empirically working scholars who call their way of research either phenomenological description or hermeneutic interpretation. That is to say, we are not primarily focused upon essential meanings per se. It is possible that we also make assumptions (that we should not), in which we presume that everyone reads and understands our text and approach as we do. Albeit, we do expect that readers try their best to grasp the message that we communicate, and also to reach out to us to continue the dialogue.

Conclusion

To conclude, our response to Byrne’s critique is that: No, our publications do not include any misreadings of Husserl. We appreciate Husserl’s philosophy and know that it must be interpreted and translated carefully to be of use, especially when employed outside traditional philosophical pursuits. To be clear, we agree with much of Byrne’s philosophical analyses in the article, but we do not agree that Husserl’s value ends with philosophy. That would be very unfortunate, and a tremendous loss, since his insights are both profound and meaningful also to other than philosophers. We argue that if Husserl’s insights were to be fully accepted by the scientific community, the narrow scientific paradigm would radically change for the better. Then the idea of lifeworld would be more important than prescribing one and only method. If interpreted and understood in a thorough and comprehensive manner, even Husserl’s extremely complicated ideas on the epoché and essences can enlighten empirical working researchers. With the robust foundation of phenomenological philosophy, we can create research that is capable “of more than a frozen existence,” as Merleau-Ponty says (1964/1968, s. 66).