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Abstract

Experimental studies show that public opinion cues shape people’s perceptions of public opinion. However, the full extent of political information these cues comprise and, consequently, communicate remains unexplored. This study utilizes standardized content analysis to examine the political values in applauded statements (n = 1,722) from Ukraine’s major political talk shows. The results suggest that applauded statements embody a complex mix of identity- and governance-oriented values, signaling to the broader audience the preferred type of political debate among those within the studio. The study enhances the literature on public opinion cues by demonstrating the significance of analyzing their underlying content.

Keywords

public opinion cues perceived public opinion political talk shows value frames applause

Individuals use public opinion cues to infer the “actual” public opinion, encompassing both specific issue positions and more general political values (Lu & Sun, 2022; Merkley & Stecula, 2021; Porten-Cheé & Eilders, 2020). This occurs as we read the news (Gunther, 1998), browse social media (Neubaum & Krämer, 2017), and communicate with others (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). The majority of encountered public opinion cues are implicit, providing not a direct portrayal of public sentiment, but rather hints at what it could be (Peter & Beckers, 2022). Such implicit cues can be diverse ranging from the news slant to the type and number of user reactions under a social media post.

While prior research has delved into the impact of implicit cues on people’s perceptions of public opinion (Davis, 1999; Lee et al., 2021; Leong & Ho, 2021; Peter, 2021), less attention has been paid to the content to which such cues refer. This article bridges this gap by investigating the political values underlying implicit public opinion cues, focusing on audience applause during political talk shows as a case study. In doing so, we do not assume that applause patterns in talk show settings reflect public opinion in the studio, much less that of the general population. However, based on the extensive literature on public opinion cues (Beckers, 2019; Friemel & Dötsch, 2015; Nabi & Hendriks, 2003; Peter, 2021; Zerback et al., 2015), we do posit that applause can influence how the broader audience perceives the dominant public opinion within the talk show studios and potentially beyond. This underpins our interest in analyzing the content of applauded statements on political talk shows.

The study draws on a new dataset featuring 39 episodes of the two leading Ukrainian political talk shows with annotated audience applause segments (n = 1,722). The two programs employed different applause moderation strategies: one exclusively featured spontaneous applause, whereas the other utilized a combination of spontaneous and moderated applause. Using standardized content analysis, we identify value frames (Scheufele & Engelmann, 2018; Weiß et al., 2020) present in the talk shows’ applauded statements, distinguishing between identity- and governance-oriented frames. The findings indicate a similar prevalence but different functions of the two types of frames within the applauded statements. Speakers invoked identity-oriented frames—such as anti-elitism, people-centrism, and patriotism—to stir in-group solidarity and derogate out-groups, thereby charging the political discourse with emotion. At the same time, governance-oriented frames, including democracy, rule of law, expertise, and pragmatism, contributed to the substantive part of the debate. By examining the interplay between these two types of frames, the study highlights the potential of public opinion cues to shape perceptions of various political values within the mass media audience. It also explores how different actors contribute to the promotion of specific values, considering the varying applause moderation strategies on the studied talk shows.

The rest of the article is organized as follows: First, we define public opinion cues and conceptualize audience applause on political talk shows as an implicit public opinion cue. We then introduce value frames as an analytical tool for examining political values underlying implicit cues. Following this, we formulate research questions guiding our analysis and describe the study’s data and methodology. The findings section details the distribution of applause by talk show, topic, and actor group and analyzes the predominant value frames. Finally, we discuss our findings within the framework of existing research on implicit public opinion cues and audience reactions to political speeches, calling for more scholarly attention to the content to which such cues refer.

Public Opinion and Public Opinion Cues

Public opinion is commonly understood as the aggregation of individual stances on a given issue within a binary for/against logic (Peter, 2021, p. 348). Such a definition suggests that public opinion cannot be studied in a general sense but rather in the context of specific topics, policies, or personas. Regarding each of these topics, policies, and personas, a majority and minority position can be identified at a given point in time. Despite its dominance, this view of public opinion has faced recurring criticism for its narrow scope, as well as its failure to account for the inherently social and dynamic nature of public opinion (Guber, 2021; Herbst, 1993; Lewis, 2001). In contrast, broader approaches to public opinion emphasize political attitudes, beliefs, and values at the core of the phenomenon (Howe & Krosnick, 2022; Price & Neijens, 1997). According to this more inclusive perspective, understanding public opinion involves more than merely quantifying people’s opinions; it also requires an exploration of the underlying reasons for those opinions, for instance, through studying people’s structure of values (Noelle-Neumann, 1998; Petersen et al., 2010).

From the viewpoint of the citizen, public opinion is communicated via public opinion cues, which serve as indicators of the prevailing opinion climate within the public sphere (Lewis, 2001). Zerback and colleagues (2015) distinguish between explicit and implicit public opinion cues. Explicit cues convey public opinion directly, for example, by referencing opinion polls. When these referenced data are valid, representative, and interpreted correctly, explicit cues can be informative. On the other hand, implicit cues do not refer to any empirical evidence and require the recipient’s involvement to form a cognitive link between an implicit cue and public opinion. This usually includes generalization based on the cue presented. For instance, should an individual consistently engage with news media that display a bias toward a particular policy option, they might deduce that this policy option enjoys greater public support than it actually does (Gunther, 1998).

People are more frequently exposed to implicit cues than explicit ones, given that the former are more diverse and can be disseminated by a wide range of actors. For instance, politicians often claim to represent the voice of the people and make casual assertions about public opinion without empirical support (Peter, 2021). In the realm of journalism, it is a common practice for the mass media to employ so-called “exemplars” or “vox pops” that showcase individual opinions and behavior (Yan & Liu, 2016; Zillmann, 1999; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). Such exemplars are intended to add an ordinary citizen perspective to a news story, but can also be used by the media consumers to make inferences about public opinion. Furthermore, individuals pay attention to implicit cues emanating from other members of the public. This includes both our immediate social circles and the broader digital landscape, where, for example, user comments and reactions on social media serve as indicators of public opinion climate (Lee et al., 2021; Leong & Ho, 2021).

Individuals process explicit and implicit cues differently. When faced with explicit cues, such as survey results, an individual may attempt to comprehend and remember this information to retrieve it later (Sonck & Loosveldt, 2010). In contrast, judgments based on implicit cues are formed through cognitive heuristics, a largely subconscious process that enables individuals to make assessments in the absence of direct information (Zerback et al., 2015, p. 423).

Several theories shed light on the reasons why people monitor the social environment for implicit cues. The spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) posits that individuals have an inherent fear of isolation, leading them to continuously observe others’ positions trying to discern the dominant public opinion. Social comparison theory (Gerber et al., 2018; for a seminal study, see Festinger, 1954) suggests that people tend to compare themselves against others to evaluate and affirm their own views and behavior. The autokinetic effect (Abrams & Levine, 2012; for a seminal study, see Sherif, 1937) also demonstrates that, when lacking clear external references, individuals may conform to the judgments of others and shape their perceptions based on minimal information. Experimental research supports these assumptions, showing that implicit cues play an important role in shaping people’s perceptions of public opinion, especially in the absence of explicit cues (Peter, 2021; Zerback et al., 2015).

Talk Show Audience Applause as an Implicit Public Opinion Cue

Live television political talk shows span a wide range of formats, from entertainment-focused programs like The Daily Show in the United States to those centered on political deliberation and information, such as Question Time in the United Kingdom. Many shows blend these elements, creating hybrids that cater to diverse audience preferences. This study focuses on talk shows where political debate, rather than entertainment, is at the forefront. By design, such programs should serve as sources of political information, facilitate the exchange of diverse ideas, and actively engage both political elites and the general public in political discourse (Ceron & Splendore, 2018; Ernst et al., 2019; Taniguchi, 2011). However, certain political talk shows have also faced criticism for contributing to societal polarization (Peris Blanes & Pérez-Sánchez, 2021), amplifying populism (Bos & Brants, 2014), and even disseminating foreign propaganda (Yanchenko et al., 2024). In any case, talk shows present their viewers with a specific image of political deliberation and serve as a model of the political sphere.

Political talk shows often invite audiences to their studios to introduce an interactive element to the viewing experience. In such cases, the studio audience assumes a crucial role in connecting the media product with its ultimate recipient—the wider audience tuning in remotely. The primary means through which the studio audience engages in the live political debate is through non-verbal reactions, such as laughter, nodding, smiling, and other forms of reaction, varying with the talk show’s format. These reactions are the main implicit cues accessible to the wider talk show audience, acting as a proxy for the public opinion climate (Davis, 1999; Nabi & Hendriks, 2003). One of the most common audience reactions on talk shows is applause (Eriksson, 2009; Eubanks et al., 2018). Applause acts as an implicit public opinion cue that can be interpreted as the studio’s agreement with a political statement, support for a specific speaker, or approval of a manner in which a point is presented. Repeated instances of applause provide talk show viewers with clues about the prevailing opinions within the talk show studio, which can then be extrapolated to wider contexts.

In principle, there are three types of applause encountered on talk shows: authentic, moderated, and a combination of both. With authentic applause, the studio audience claps freely, at moments they choose, or may choose not to applaud at all. Moderated applause is controlled, with the audience clapping only in response to a signal, such as a sign not visible to remote viewers. Combined applause involves some level of moderation, for instance, ensuring applause when new guests enter the studio, while at other times, the audience is free to clap at their discretion. Regardless of the type of applause used on a talk show, this implicit cue may prime talk show viewers to see the applauded statements as particularly important and reflective of public opinion. In this regard, the situation is not different from any other communication venue, where public opinion cues can also be inauthentic. For instance, on social media, social bots view, like, share, and comment on content for commercial and political reasons (Keller & Klinger, 2019; Linvill & Warren, 2020). Yet, the cues resulting from these strategic actions can still affect people’s perceptions of public opinion.

Most of the literature dedicated to applause in response to political speeches has primarily focused on the rhetorical aspects (Atkinson, 1984; O’Gorman & Bull, 2021). Studies in this area have identified a range of rhetorical devices, such as listing, contrasting, and puzzle-solution techniques, that politicians use to invoke applause from the audience (Bull, 2016; Bull & Miskinis, 2015). Attention has also been given to how the nuances of message delivery, including tone of voice, loudness, pitch, and speech rate, can influence a politician’s success in eliciting applause (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1986). And yet, it is not merely rhetorical techniques that audiences applaud—“they also respond to the content of political speech” (O’Gorman & Bull, 2021, p. 358). The next section discusses why paying closer attention to the content underlying implicit public opinion cues can be informative from the political communication perspective.

Studying Political Values Underlying Public Opinion Cues

We argue that the content underlying implicit public opinion cues—in our case, political statements followed by applause—can reveal more than just the endorsed positions, topics, and speakers. Beyond this, it allows us to better understand the portrayals of the political sphere and its foundational values that viewers encounter when consistently exposed to specific political statements accompanied by applause.

To illustrate, let us consider the scenario where Speaker X criticizes the political establishment for not implementing Policy Y, and this critique is met with applause. On one level, the broader talk show audience might conclude that the public generally favors Speaker X and supports Policy Y. More significantly, though, the audience might also discern an endorsement of the statement’s anti-establishment stance and a preference for a confrontational communication style. If statements possessing these meta-characteristics consistently receive applause, they will play a significant role in shaping the wider audience’s perception of political debate conduct and, ultimately, the functioning of the political sphere. This leads to the question: What political values are embedded in applauded statements? To provide a theoretical ground for investigating this question, we turn to the concept of value frames (Scheufele & Engelmann, 2018; Weiß et al., 2020).

The concept of value frames is closely related to the traditional understanding of framing in media studies (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005; von Sikorski & Matthes, 2020; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012) in that both involve the selective presentation and emphasis of certain aspects of an issue to construct a particular reality. However, while traditional media framing research focuses on the strategic choices of journalists and other actors in shaping public perception and discourse on specific topics, value frames delve into the underlying political values that inform these representations. Unlike traditional framing, which can vary greatly depending on the issue at hand, value frames are abstract, topic-independent, and relatively stable constructs, serving as “orientation anchors” for citizens (Scheufele & Engelmann, 2018, p. 129). They are “patterns of interpretations based on fundamental political values” (Weiß et al., 2020, p. 283) that define an individual’s position vis-à-vis the political sphere.

Notably, what qualifies as “fundamental political values” will depend on the specific socio-political context. Thus, Weiß and colleagues (2020) explored the representation of three pairs of value frames—market liberalism versus welfare state orientation, libertarianism versus authoritarianism, and integration versus demarcation—within German national media. Similarly, Scheufele and Engelmann (2018) distinguished between left- and right-wing value frames, each encompassing various value frame indicators. The application of value frames has also been analyzed in debates on specific issues, including the values of equality and freedom in the abortion discourse (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990), as well as tradition and fairness in discussions around transgender athlete bans (Martin & Rahilly, 2023). The common thread among these varied studies is their emphasis on uncovering the values acting as a frame of reference in a given context. Building upon this approach, we aim to investigate the core political values embedded in applauded statements on political talk shows.

The study focuses on two types of value frames: identity- and governance-oriented. Identity-oriented value frames reflect and reinforce the norms tied to the social identities of groups and communities (Tajfel, 1974), while governance-oriented value frames advocate general principles and ideologies for managing public affairs (Scheufele & Engelmann, 2018).

Our interest in identity-oriented value frames stems from previous research showing that out-group derogation and in-group praise constitute up to 95% of the applause instances during public political speeches (Atkinson, 1984; Bull & Wells, 2002; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1986). Based on this finding, we anticipate that identity-oriented frames, which focus on in- and out-group dynamics, will also be salient in the political talk show genre. Examples of identity-oriented value frames include patriotism, which resonates with people’s sense of belonging to their nation—an in-group—as well as people-centrism and anti-elitism. People-centrism focuses on prioritizing the interests of “the people” as a homogeneous in-group, while anti-elitism is characterized by distrust and opposition toward an immoral and privileged out-group (Aalberg et al., 2018). Together, people-centrism and anti-elitism form the essence of populism, which views politics as a moral struggle between the virtuous common people and a corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). To investigate value frames focused on in- and out-group dynamics, we ask:

RQ1: What is the role of identity-oriented value frames in the applauded statements on the studied talk shows?

The rationale for focusing on governance-oriented value frames lies in their importance for public discourse and democratic deliberation (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990; Martin & Rahilly, 2023; Scheufele & Engelmann, 2018). These frames provide the structural and ideological backdrop against which political decisions are debated and understood. They encompass references to economic, political, and moral values, offering a lens through which audiences can evaluate politics. Some of the value frames conceptualized by Weiß and colleagues (2020), such as market liberalism, welfare state orientation, libertarianism, and authoritarianism, provide good examples of governance-oriented value frames. Thus, we inquire:

RQ2: What is the role of governance-oriented value frames in the applauded statements on the studied talk shows?

Although scholars often categorize value frames as distinct and autonomous entities, in reality, different frames overlap and intermingle within political discourse. This interplay shapes the audience’s perception of individual values. To explore this dynamic, we pose the following question:

RQ3: Which value frames most frequently co-occur in the applauded statements on the studied talk shows?

Finally, making use of the fact that our dataset contains two talk shows with different handling of applause, we ask the following:

RQ4: What are the differences in applause patterns and value frames on the talk shows with different applause moderation strategies?

Context: Ukrainian Political and Media System in the Study Period

Before discussing the methodology of the study, it is essential to briefly outline the Ukrainian political and media landscape during the time frame covered by the analyzed TV broadcasts. The examined period started shortly after the Ukrainian parliamentary election on July 21, 2019, which international observers deemed “generally competitive and credible” (Freedom House, 2020). Volodymyr Zelensky’s party, Servant of the People, achieved a mono-majority, while other political parties became a fragmented opposition. Although these parties occasionally collaborated with Servant of the People on specific issues, they primarily aimed to challenge the mono-majority by denouncing its policy line. For example, Yurii Boiko’s Opposition Platform for Life called for intensified rapprochement with Russia, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s Motherland sought to undermine certain reforms, like land and labor code reforms, and Petro Poroshenko’s European Solidarity critiqued Zelensky’s team’s approach to peace talks with Russia. These power dynamics, featuring one dominant and several smaller factions debating various socio-political issues, were a defining characteristic across both studied talk shows during the sampled time frame.

As for the specific shows selected for analysis, we focus on Savik Shuster’s Freedom of Speech (FOS) and Right to Power (RTP), the leading Ukrainian political talk shows in 2019–2020 (Media Business Reports, 2021).¹ FOS was broadcast on the “Ukraine” TV channel, and RTP on the “1+1” channel, owned by the Ukrainian oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov and Ihor Kolomoiskii, respectively. Both channels were emblematic of a Ukrainian commercial television landscape defined by “oligarchic pluralism” (Lyhachova, 2015), wherein TV channels collectively present a diversity of viewpoints, yet each individually exhibits biases toward specific political forces, most notably during electoral periods (Ryabinska, 2011; Yanchenko et al., 2024). For instance, the “Ukraine” channel, which broadcasted FOS, was known to maintain favorable relationships with such top politicians as Oleh Liashko, Petro Poroshenko, and Yuliia Tymoshenko (Kravets, 2018). Conversely, “1+1” was reported to have supported Zelensky and his team during the 2019 elections (Solonyna & Shevchenko, 2021). Such manifestations of media-political parallelism could influence the dynamics of applause on both talk shows in at least two significant ways. First, talk show producers may create more favorable conditions for certain speakers by allowing them extended microphone time or providing particularly supportive moderation. This can enhance their persuasiveness and, consequently, result in more applause compared to their opponents. Second, if applause is moderated or partially so, this control could be strategically applied to bolster certain speakers or viewpoints over others. While these dynamics are not the focus of our study, it is important to acknowledge their potential influence when interpreting the overall patterns of applause in a media system characterized by media-political parallelism.

Method

Data

The study draws on a new dataset² assembled from all episodes of FOS and RTP, aired over 6 months from September 2019 to February 2020.³ This period saw the release of 20 episodes of FOS and 19 of RTP, cumulatively spanning 84 hr of content. In terms of the format, the two talk shows were late-night, weekly live TV broadcasts, also streamed on YouTube. Both had a studio audience, with FOS claiming a 100-person audience mirroring Ukraine’s demographics and RTP not disclosing audience details. Each talk show episode centered around one to three topical issues, discussed by a panel comprising politicians, journalists, experts, and other guests. To our best knowledge, the two talk shows employed different applause moderation strategies: FOS did not use applause moderation, whereas RTP moderated applause in some cases, particularly, to support points made by its host Nataliia Moseichuk. This information was obtained from the former employees of the respective channels on the condition of anonymity. While we are highly confident in this information, we cannot guarantee absolute certainty.

Applauded Statements

After the relevant episodes were downloaded from the talk shows’ YouTube channels, applauded statements had to be identified. First, we annotated all applause instances using MAXQDA, which allows viewing video files and coding specific segments of their timeline. We differentiated between content- and structure-related applause. For this task, two coders independently labeled 100 instances of applause and achieved a 100% agreement rate. The code “content-related applause” was assigned to applause segments that occurred in response to a meaningful statement relevant to the debate in the studio. Conversely, “structure-related applause” referred to applause instances that were not tied to any substantive content, such as applause occurring before and after commercial breaks, or when talk show guests were introduced. Only content-related applause instances were selected for further analysis (1,722 out of 2,699). The duration of each applause instance was measured in seconds. Other aspects of applause, such as its loudness or whether it was accompanied by additional indicators of excitement (e.g., cheering, laughter), were not considered. In the next step, we transcribed each applauded statement and the full name of the speaker who made it. The aim was to capture the complete thought leading to applause, which sometimes included several shorter utterances. The average length of the transcribed applauded statements was 29 words, with a standard deviation of 13 words.

Topics

To gain insight into the context surrounding applauded statements, we labeled topics discussed on the talk shows at the level of episodes or their segments, depending on whether a given episode covered a single or multiple topics. Detailed topic labels were derived from the episodes’ descriptions on YouTube. Subsequently, we aggregated these detailed topics, along with their respective durations, into six overarching topics: Social Welfare, Crime & Justice, Government Affairs, War & Peace, Reforms, and Other. For instance, the War & Peace topic included discussions of the second Minsk agreement, troop disengagement in specific front sections, the release of prisoners from Russian captivity, and preparations for the meeting in Normandy format. For information about the composition of the six overarching topics, see Appendix.

Actor Groups

To assess the distribution of applause among various actor groups, each speaker who elicited applause was assigned one of 13 predefined actor group categories. The classification framework draws from actor diversity studies referenced in the Database of Variables for Content Analysis (DOCA, Humprecht, 2021). The codes included “politicians,” “civil servants and government officials,” “media and journalists,” “experts and academics,” “business professionals,” and so on (for the full list of actors, see Appendix). A list of all unique speakers was generated, upon which two independent coders assigned actor group categories based on YouTube episode descriptions and information from open sources. Any disagreements in coding were resolved through discussion.

Value Frames

The identification of value frames in the applauded statements proceeded in three steps that combined inductive and deductive approaches and were as follows: (a) compiling a list of value frames representative of the data; (b) categorizing these frames into identity-oriented and governance-oriented value frames; and (c) applying the value frames across the entire corpus of applauded statements. Below, each of the steps is explained in detail.

The decision to inductively compile a list of value frames was informed by the unique context of our study, which focuses on the case from Eastern Europe, unlike most previous research concentrated on Western countries. This difference is important because, as Scheufele and Engelmann highlight, “values can only become effective as a frame of reference if they are sufficiently ‘sedimented’ in the political culture” (Scheufele & Engelmann, 2018, p. 128, translated by the authors). Thus, two coders, both familiar with Ukrainian politics, independently reviewed a randomly selected 10% subset of the applauded statements. Each coder compiled a list of value frames that appeared at least three times within the subset. Subsequently, they collaboratively compared and refined their findings and agreed on a consolidated list of 12 value frames.

The next step involved classifying these value frames into two predefined theoretical categories: identity-oriented and governance-oriented frames. Frames were labeled identity-oriented if they involved in-group and/or out-group dynamics. Conversely, frames emphasizing the conduct of politics were deemed governance-oriented. Value frames “Security” and “Morality” presented classification challenges due to their potential overlap with both categories. “Security” was ultimately classified as an identity-oriented frame because, in our data, it was primarily used in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war with clear in- and out-group separation. “Morality,” in turn, was categorized under governance-oriented frames, as it predominantly addressed the principles of honesty and justice in political affairs. Table 1 summarizes the value frames, with a more detailed version including examples from the data available in the Appendix.

Table 1.

Value Frames Used for the Coding of Applauded Statements on FOS and RTP.

Value frame	Description
Identity-oriented value frames
Anti-elitism	References to political, financial, and other types of elites as dysfunctional, ineffective, and generally harmful to society.
Patriotism	References to patriotic feelings such as national pride, unity and solidarity among the national community, and love for one’s country.
People-centrism	References to common people as the primary source of wisdom, morality, and sovereignty. Focus on the principles that prioritize the well-being, rights, and interests of the common people.
Security	References to the collective need for protection and resilience in the face of external threats. Focus on maintaining state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Governance-oriented value frames
Authority	References to established leadership, hierarchical power, tradition, status, and control.
Democracy	References to democratic values, such as freedom of expression, pluralism, and electoral integrity.
Economic left	References to economic principles that emphasize wealth redistribution, social welfare, and the regulation of businesses to protect workers, consumers, and the environment.
Economic right	References to economic principles that emphasize free market capitalism, lower taxes, limited government intervention in the economy, and private property rights.
Expertise	References to professional experience, specialized knowledge, technical skills, and informed opinions.
Morality	References to ethical principles, fairness, and justice as core elements in the formulation and implementation of laws and policies.
Pragmatism	References to a practical approach to problems that focuses on results and practical consequences rather than ideology or theory. Willingness to work within existing conditions and compromise to achieve the best possible outcome.
Rule of law	References to legal principles such as judicial fairness, adherence to constitutional norms, and the application of laws equally to all individuals.

The final step entailed assigning four identity-oriented and eight governance-oriented value frames to the complete corpus of applauded statements. Each statement could be coded with multiple value frames, a single one, or none at all. Before coding took place, a 10% subset of the data was used to evaluate intercoder reliability, using Krippendorff’s alpha. Two coders achieved an average agreement of 0.82, with the minimum alpha value being .66 for the “Authority” frame and the maximum being 1 for “Economic right.” Detailed results of the intercoder agreement for each specific frame are available in the Appendix.

Findings

Applause Distribution by Talk Show, Topic, and Actor

This section presents basic information about the applause dataset to provide context for understanding the subsequent analysis of value frames. During the studied period, 1,722 instances of content-related applause were identified on the two talk shows: 650 on FOS and 1,072 on RTP. The majority of utterances leading to applause were statements as opposed to questions, accounting for 90% of the cases on FOS and 84% on RTP. Shapiro–Wilk tests confirmed the applause was normally distributed across episodes of both talk shows (W_FOS = .95, p = .297; W_RTP = .95, p = .357). On the average episode of FOS, a show without applause moderation, the audience applauded significantly less (M = 32.50, SD = 22.34) compared to RTP (M = 56.42, SD = 15.23), t(37) = −3.89, p < .001. The average duration of applause measured in seconds was also significantly shorter on FOS (M = 3.94, SD = 1.24) than on RTP (M = 4.72, SD = 1.20), t(1720) = 12.9, p < .001. Finally, applause on FOS showed greater inconsistency than on RTP, indicated by a higher variation coefficient (0.69 vs. 0.27) and significant Levene’s test for relative variation, F(1, 37) = 10.63, p < .01.⁴

Figure 1 depicts applause frequencies by topic on both talk shows, reported per hour for comparability. On FOS, a show without applause moderation, there was no clear pattern in the topics that received the most or least applause. For instance, the “Other” category, the most applauded on FOS, encompassed discussions on the Ukrainian population census and the performance of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine—topics that were not at the forefront of public discourse at the time. The same applies to the “Social Welfare” topic that, counterintuitively, saw minimal audience response on FOS. Meanwhile, on RTP, applause distribution by topic more closely reflected public opinion from that period’s polls (Ukrinform, 2019). Thus, debates dedicated to war and peace, as well as social welfare issues, received the most applause, whereas government affairs garnered the least audience engagement.

Figure 1.

Applause Distribution by Talk Show Topic on FOS and RTP.

The analysis also sheds light on the distribution of applause by actor groups, which is mainly influenced by the selection of guests by talk show producers and the amount of airtime allocated to them. On both talk shows, politicians and government officials (two separate codes) garnered approximately half of all applause instances (54% on FOS and 48% on RTP). Notably, opinion leaders and celebrities (one code) received differing levels of applause: 18% on FOS compared to a mere 1% on RTP (χ² = 155.22, p < .001, Cohen’s h = 0.64). On FOS, this group of actors primarily included Leonid Kravchuk, former president of Ukraine, and Mikheil Saakashvili, former president of Georgia and head of the Odesa Regional State Administration from 2015 to 2016. Although neither had formal affiliations at the time the talk shows aired, both speakers were actively supporting Zelensky’s Servant of the People party and its policy line. Another significant contrast was observed in the audience’s reaction to the shows’ hosts. Savik Shuster of FOS received 7% of the applause, while Nataliia Moseichuk of RTP garnered 30% (χ² = 129.51, p < .001, Cohen’s h = −0.63). For a comprehensive breakdown of applause by actor groups, see Appendix.

Value Frames in the Applauded Statements

This section reports the results of the coding of value frames in the applauded statements. The proposed list of frames proved comprehensive, with only 12 frames covering 80% of statements on FOS and 77% on RTP. Statements to which no frame was assigned included some of the questions, humor, incivility, and meta-remarks. We start by discussing the role of identity-oriented (RQ1) and governance-oriented (RQ2) value frames in the talk shows’ applauded statements and then present the most typical value frame co-occurrences (RQ3). Finally, we discuss any differences in applause patterns between the two talk shows that could potentially be attributed to varying applause moderation strategies (RQ4).

Identity-Oriented Value Frames

As seen from Table 2, identity-oriented frames were salient on both talk shows. They appeared in more than 60% of applauded statements on FOS and in almost 55% on RTP.

Table 2.

Value Frames Prevalence in the Applauded Statements on FOS and RTP.

Value frame (n)	Talk show		Statistics
Value frame (n)	FOS(n = 650)%	RTP(n = 1,072)%	χ²	Sig.	Cohen’s h
Anti-elitism (358)	24.8	18.4	9.656	**	0.156
Patriotism (225)	15.4	11.7	4.618	*	0.109
Morality (209)	14.3	10.8	4.292	*	0.105
People-centrism (246)	13.7	14.6	0.227	ns	−0.027
Economic Left (147)	12.9	5.9	24.836	***	0.246
Rule of law (191)	9.2	12.2	3.370	ns	−0.097
Democracy (185)	6.8	13.2	16.538	***	−0.216
Pragmatism (156)	6.6	10.5	7.100	**	−0.141
Security (153)	6.6	10.3	6.201	*	−0.132
Authority (84)	4.9	4.9	0.000	ns	0.003
Expertise (112)	4.6	7.6	5.636	*	−0.127
Economic Right (39)	2.5	2.1	0.068	ns	0.021
Identity-oriented (982)	60.5	54.9	4.804	*	0.112
Governance-oriented (1,123)	61.8	67.3	4.987	*	−0.113

Note. The table displays the percentages of individual value frames relative to the total applauded statements in the two talk shows. As some statements were coded with multiple value frames, the total percentages for individual value frames surpass 100%. Two final rows present the percentages of identity- and governance-oriented value frames relative to the total applauded statements. To identify significant differences between the talk shows, two-sample tests for equality of proportions with continuity correction were conducted. Proportional differences are highlighted in bold for a Cohen’s h value of ±0.2 or greater (see Cohen, 1988, p. 198).

Significance levels are marked as *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The most prominent single value frame was anti-elitism found mainly in the talk show segments devoted to reforms. Following the operationalization by Ernst and colleagues (2017, p. 258), we coded anti-elitism when a relatively privileged actor was discredited, blamed for harmful developments, or discursively detached from “the people” in an applauded statement.⁵ Thus, criticism of “big corporations” was common in discussions about the land ownership liberalization law initiated by Zelensky and his team: “[Corporations] . . . saturate everything with chemicals, collect raw materials, export them abroad, receive a small margin on large volumes, steal value-added tax from the budget, and they thrive. [APPLAUSE]” (Yuliia Tymoshenko, leader of the Motherland party, RTP, row 801).⁶ The reform of accounting rules for private entrepreneurs also triggered many anti-elitist remarks, to which the audience reacted with applause: “. . . Entrepreneurs will include these costs in the cost of goods . . . and we will all pay for these whims of the government out of our own pockets. 22 billion! [APPLAUSE]” (Serhii Dorotych, NGO representative, FOS, row 190).

Patriotism was another notable identity-oriented frame on the talk shows. On FOS, it appeared in more than 15% of the applauded statements and became the second most prominent frame. On RTP, it also played a huge role appearing in almost 12% of the statements. Patriotism was most commonly referenced in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, for example: “ . . . It was incomprehensible to [European leaders] that, in the 21st century, we were willing to give our lives and shed blood for our independence. That’s how much respect we received. [APPLAUSE]” (Akhtem Chyihoz, MP from the European Solidarity party, FOS, row 48) or “Our agricultural land is in Paris, in the reference chamber, as a benchmark for black soils worldwide. [APPLAUSE]” (Yuliia Tymoshenko, leader of the Motherland party, FOS, row 112). References to patriotism were least common in the discussions of government affairs.

People-centrism, another identity-oriented value frame, appeared in similar proportions on both talk shows. Notably, the RTP host contributed significantly to this frame, accounting for more than 36% of people-centrism instances on the talk show, a figure comparable to 41% of references to people-centrism attributed to politicians. On FOS, the host was responsible for about 7% of statements containing people-centrism. On both talk shows, references to people-centrism were most frequent in the statements related to reforms. Politicians and other actors relied on this value frame to stress that any reforms should only be undertaken if they are for the benefit of the “common people.”

Finally, security emerged as the least salient identity-oriented frame, appearing in about 7% of applauded statements on FOS and 10% on RTP. As expected, most of the references to security were made in the talk show segments dedicated to war and peace issues, for instance: “And where are the guarantees that Putin, after this Normandy Format meeting, will suddenly become kind, and won’t attack Ukraine again? [APPLAUSE]” (Sofiia Fedyna, MP from the European Solidarity party, RTP, row 912).

Governance-Oriented Value Frames

Governance-oriented frames were also prominent in the applauded statements (see Table 2), with RTP even referencing more governance- than identity-oriented values. These are also governance-oriented frames where we observe the only meaningful differences between applauded statements on the two talk shows. Particularly, the “Economic Left” frame was more salient on FOS and the “Democracy” frame on RTP.⁷ We proceed with a closer examination of these two frames.

On both talk shows, references to left economic principles were primarily made in the context of reforms. This included, for instance, the labor law reform: “Within a year, a person can’t be made to work more than 120 hours. And for these 120 hours, the employer is obligated to pay double. [APPLAUSE]” (Yuliia Tymoshenko, leader of the Motherland party, FOS, row 455) or the land reform: “Dear friends, the land is not a car or an apartment. You can manufacture a car . . . and sell it a hundred times. Ukrainians can only sell the land once! [APPLAUSE]” (Yuliia Tymoshenko, leader of the Motherland party, RTP, row 1195). On FOS, references to left economic values were also salient during the discussions of social welfare issues which was not the case on RTP.

As for the speakers responsible for the applauded statements referencing left economic values, these were often the politicians known for their demagogic communication style (Kuzio, 2019). The disparity in the share of the “Economic left” frame between the two talk shows is largely due to the greater airtime allocated for such politicians on FOS. For instance, Yuliia Tymoshenko and Oleh Liashko, both having a negative stance on economic liberalization, were responsible for 46% of all applauded statements referencing left economic values on FOS. On RTP, Tymoshenko had considerably less airtime and Liashko did not appear at all. At the same time, the speaker with the most applauded statements referencing “Economic Left” on RTP was the talk show host.

It is also worth noting that unlike “Economic Left,” “Economic Right” was the least referenced value in the applauded statements on both talk shows. This is despite the fact that the majority of references to “Economic Right” were made by guests affiliated with Zelensky and his political party, which held an absolute majority in parliament and had representatives in every episode of both talk shows. Assuming that “1+1” was loyal to Zelensky’s political force, we would have expected to see more applause for statements supporting the right economic values on RTP. However, the absence of such a pattern argues against the presence of politically motivated applause moderation on this talk show. Apparently, it was the value frame itself that did not resonate with the Ukrainian audience on both talk shows.

As far as references to democratic values are concerned, they ranked third in prominence for applauded statements on RTP but only seventh on FOS. On FOS, nearly half of the references to democracy were tied to discussions on reforms, whereas on RTP, mentions of democratic values were more diversified across topics. For instance, statements mentioning freedom of expression received applause as the RTP studio was discussing Kyiv protests against concessions to Russia: “ . . . People have the right . . . to talk about their concerns, fears, and dissatisfaction. We’ve been fighting for this [right] since 2014, since the [Euro]maidan. [APPLAUSE]” (Mykyta Poturaiev, MP from the Servant of the People party, RTP, row 1326). Similarly, the value of transparency was referenced during the discussion of government affairs: “It seems to me that today we are not talking about some closed form of work [in the parliament] . . . Even today there are enough representatives of our political force on air. [APPLAUSE]” (Dmytro Razumkov, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, MP from the Servant of the People party, RTP, row 652). Nonetheless, on both talk shows, the democratic frame was also often used superficially, overlapping with people-centrism as part of the populist communication strategy. This included demands for referendums on contentious political issues and assertions that “the people” should be the only source of power in Ukraine.

The “Authority” frame was referenced relatively rarely in the applauded statements. At the same time, on FOS, it appeared almost as frequently as “Democracy.” Often, references to authority were made on the background of certain security challenges, such as those posed by the COVID-19 pandemic: “The state needs to establish control over the entire process of drug distribution, starting from the manufacturer to every pharmacy storage. [APPLAUSE]” (Oleksii Danilov, secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, RTP, row 1629).

As for the other governance-oriented frames, there were slightly more references to expertise and pragmatism on RTP while applauded statements on FOS were slightly more moralistic. The prevalence of the “Rule of Law” frame did not differ between the two talk shows.

Value Frame Co-Occurrence

Of all applauded statements, approximately 40% contained a single value frame, 30% incorporated two frames, 6% three frames, and less than 1% four frames. Further analysis focuses on the most common pairwise frame co-occurrences, as depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Top Ten Value Frame Co-Occurrences on FOS and RTP.

The most prevalent frame co-occurrence on both talk shows was Anti-elitism × Morality. This indicates that elites were predominantly criticized for their lack of morality rather than being labeled as incompetent (Anti-elitism × Expertise) or undemocratic (Anti-elitism × Democracy). For instance, one talk show guest denounced politicians in the studio for lacking principles and opportunistically switching political affiliations: “You . . . [first] messed things up, imposed cash registers, and now you’ve joined a new team and changed sides in time. [APPLAUSE]” (Serhii Dorotych, NGO representative, FOS, row 205). It was also common to reinforce anti-elitist critiques with allegations of dishonesty: “. . . The minister [is] sitting here and telling lies! . . . That’s why I have a proposal: Let’s prepare a petition for the resignation of this government with this minister. [APPLAUSE]” (Nataliia Korolevska, MP from the Opposition Platform for Life party, FOS, row 487).

People-centrism × Economic left, the second most frequent frame combination on both talk show shows, represented those statements that endorsed left economic values as central for the “ordinary people.” An illustrative example is when the newly appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal criticized the former ruling party for failing to address critical socio-economic challenges faced by “the people,” stating, “. . . People have had enough. People are asking, ‘Tell us where the jobs are . . . where are the wages?’ [APPLAUSE]” (Denys Shmyhal, Prime Minister of Ukraine, RTP, row 1711). The RTP host also employed the People-centrism × Economic left combination while moderating the show: “Our viewers are not interested in [the structure of] Naftohaz [company], they are interested in whether prices will be lower. [APPLAUSE]” (Nataliia Moseichuk, RTP host, row 1712).

There were also notable distinctions in the interaction of different value frames between the two talk shows. The Anti-elitism × People-centrism combination ranked among the top 10 co-occurrences for both programs but held a higher position on RTP, reflecting, among other things, a populist moderation style employed by the talk show host Nataliia Moseichuk. This included the combination of people-centrist bias manifestations, such as speaking on behalf of the people’s concerns (Wettstein et al., 2018, p. 479), and anti-elitist or anti-establishment bias manifestations, for example, expressing cynicism about elites in general rather than critiquing specific elites (Krämer, 2014). At the same time, RTP also exhibited signs of a substantive political debate. For example, the elevated presence of the Democracy × Rule of Law frames combination highlights the recognition of legality, human rights, and other democratic values in the talk show’s applauded statements. Furthermore, when authority was referenced on RTP, it was often attributed to individuals’ or organizations’ knowledge and expertise (Authority × Expertise) rather than their morality or political affiliation. For FOS, it is evident that frame combinations featuring “Economic Left” (such as Anti-elitism × Economic Left or Patriotism × Economic Left) had a higher prominence compared to RTP, emphasizing the significant role of this value frame in the former talk show.

Applause Moderation Strategies

Our final research question inquired whether any differences in applause patterns on the studied talk shows could be attributed to their varying applause moderation strategies. It is important to note here again that our assumptions about the applause moderation strategies on the talk shows were based on information provided by former employees of the respective channels, who informed us that FOS did not moderate applause at all, while RTP moderated applause in certain cases, particularly to support statements made by the talk show host. We will build on this information in our further analysis.

Regarding the value frames in the applauded statements, no discernible differences can be attributed to the varying applause moderation strategies across the talk shows. For instance, had RTP displayed a significantly higher proportion of anti-elitism in applauded statements, it might suggest that producers were using applause moderation to encourage viewer support for criticisms targeting specific actors. Yet, RTP exhibited even fewer instances of anti-elitism than FOS, without a clear focus on any particular political group. The increased presence of the democracy frame in RTP’s applauded statements does not appear to be related to selective applause moderation. Similarly, the reduced presence of the economic left frame on RTP is more likely a result of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s frequent appearances on FOS, influenced by media-political parallelism dynamics, rather than strategic applause moderation on RTP.

When examining the more general patterns of applause on both talk shows, some differences can potentially be explained by the varying applause moderation strategies. Most notably, the RTP host Nataliia Moseichuk received significantly more applause than the FOS host Savik Shuster (30% vs. 7% of all applause instances, χ² = 129.51, p < .001, Cohen’s h = −0.63). This aligns with our information about RTP facilitating statements by its host through moderated applause. In addition, on RTP, applause was more consistent across episodes and lasted longer on average. In contrast, on FOS, which reportedly employed authentic applause, the amount of applause was more influenced by the topic discussed and the invited speakers. This pattern supports our information, as the absence of applause moderation means the audience will not always be equally engaged, reacting with applause primarily to the most exciting moments of the talk show.

Discussion

Applause on political talk shows, whether authentic or moderated, acts as an implicit indicator of the studio’s public opinion climate for the broader talk show audience (Davis, 1999; Nabi & Hendriks, 2003). The act of applauding does more than show support for specific policies or speakers—it also signals to the broader talk show audience which political values the studio audience deems (un)worthy of applause. This article examined the role of various identity- and governance-oriented value frames in statements followed by applause on two leading Ukrainian talk shows to uncover the political sphere portrayals that these statements projected to the talk show audience.

As far as identity-oriented value frames are concerned (RQ1), our study corroborates previous research findings, which have shown that audience applause is often driven by statements that accentuate people’s identities by praising the in-group and derogating the out-group. Specifically, our findings resonate with those of Atkinson (1984) and Heritage and Greatbatch (1986), who observed that a significant proportion of audience applause in British political party conferences could be attributed to such types of statements. Despite the socio-cultural shift from the Western to the Eastern European case and more than three decades between the studies, the relevance of identity-oriented frames persists. The likely reason behind the omnipresence of identity-oriented value frames in applauded statements across cultures and time frames is that by delineating in- and out-groups, these frames target people’s emotions. Experimental research has repeatedly shown that the discursive construction of out-groups and the attribution of blame to them trigger anger in the recipients of political communication (Hameleers et al., 2017; Yanchenko, 2022). Some degree of anger in the political discourse should not necessarily hinder democratic deliberation, as it can facilitate constructive processes such as political mobilization. However, when this hostile emotion becomes excessive, it is often associated with the limitation of personal freedoms, incivility in electoral politics, promotion of stereotypes, and disrespect of opposing views (Humprecht et al., 2020, 2024). The same is true for value frames engaging in-group identities, such as people-centrism and patriotism, which target the emotion of pride (Harth et al., 2013). While such frames may be conducive to social cohesion, especially in times of crisis, when used in combination with attacks against out-groups, they function as strong partisan identifiers and facilitate affective polarization between different societal groups (Miller & Conover, 2015).

At the same time, our research revealed significant divergence in the prevalence of identity-oriented value frames when comparing political talk shows (this study) with unmoderated public speeches (previous research). In our analysis, approximately 60% of the applauded statements referenced identity-oriented values, a stark contrast to the 81% to 95% reported by Bull (2016, p. 478) in the context of British political party conferences. This discrepancy likely reflects the unique dynamics of the political talk show genre. Characterized by journalistic moderation and the presence of opponents, talk shows facilitate substantive debate among politicians and other speakers. Consequently, while references to in- and out-groups are still common in applauded statements on talk shows, they occur less frequently compared to unmoderated political speeches. This finding highlights the importance of including diverse actors and viewpoints in talk show studios, supported by professional moderation, to facilitate meaningful political debate.

Governance-oriented frames (RQ2) were also salient in the applauded statements, highlighting a range of political values that speakers advocated as essential for guiding public affairs. References to “Democracy,” “Rule of Law,” “Pragmatism,” and “Expertise” indicated a commitment to democratic deliberation on both talk shows as these frames foster a communication environment that prioritizes rule-based decision-making, informed dialogue, and the practical application of expertise in public affairs. At the same time, the notable emphasis on “Morality” in the applauded statements implies that moral considerations often outweighed other, more objective and formalized political values on the studied talk shows. Research into the moralization of politics demonstrates that political actors employ moral appeals for various purposes, including moral calls to action, moral justifications, but also moral self-praise and moral attacks (Bos et al., 2023, p. 24; Bos & Minihold, 2022). Within our dataset, moralization predominantly emerged as a component of populist communication strategy, contributing more negatively than positively to the quality of political discourse.

Another key finding is the stark contrast between the minimal presence of economic right values and a much greater role of economic left values in the applauded statements. This disparity likely arose because references to left economic policies on both talk shows were part of a populist communication strategy that emphasized equality, social support, government subsidies, and other aspects appealing to a broad audience. This interpretation is supported by the observation that the economic left frame was most commonly paired with people-centrism on both programs. In contrast, the small share of the economic right frame in the applauded statements could reflect a persistent public resistance to economic liberalization and market-oriented reforms in Ukraine, rooted in the enduring legacies of its post-communist political culture (Shulman, 2005). Thus, within varying socio-political contexts, some value frames are more likely to garner applause than others, encouraging politicians to adhere to a limited set of proven frames to maximize public support.

In examining the co-occurrence of value frames in the applauded statements (RQ3), we found that the melding of identity- and governance-oriented frames within a single political statement was a common strategy. For instance, in the case of FOS, eight of the top 10 most frequent frame combinations included one identity- and one governance-oriented frame. This suggests that even in discussions focused on political substance, politicians and other actors consistently associate these issues with individuals’ identities. The effectiveness of this communication strategy lies in its ability to envelope any political message within the identity-oriented frame, thereby significantly enhancing its appeal (Yanchenko, 2022). Nonetheless, this approach has the side effect of transforming policy debates into matters of identity, infusing political discourse with emotion and, potentially, contributing to societal polarization.

Regarding RQ4, we did not observe any variations in the references to political values that could be attributed to different applause moderation strategies on the analyzed talk shows. However, it is conceivable that such differences would have emerged if not for the partial applause moderation on RTP. Notably, a considerable proportion of statements applauded on RTP, particularly those made by its host, were characterized by people-centrism and anti-elitism, likely bolstered by non-authentic applause. This approach aligns with RTP’s slogan “Do not take politicians at their word!” and reflects the concept of media populism which refers to the use of populist communication elements by media outlets or individual journalists, independent of political actors (Krämer, 2014; Wettstein et al., 2018). This includes constructing a binary opposition between “the people” and “the elites,” often portraying the elites as corrupt or out of touch and the people as morally pure and virtuous. Many statements by the RTP host that received applause had these characteristics. On FOS, the prevalence of anti-elitism was even higher than on RTP, while the prevalence of people-centrism was similar. However, these value frames on FOS were promoted by actors other than the talk show host, which is important given the authority of the presenter in the political talk show format (Nabi & Hendriks, 2003).

In summary, applauded statements on Ukrainian talk shows present a dual image of the political sphere: one that is rooted in identity-oriented values, delineating boundaries between “the people” and “the elites,” and another that emphasizes governance, with a stronger focus on democratic values and informed decision-making, but also with a considerable degree of moralization. These two perspectives were approximately equally represented on both studied talk shows and complemented each other during discussions on various topics. The prominence of either perspective at a given moment was influenced by the studio audience’s composition, the airtime allocated to different speakers, and, to a limited extent, by the utilized applause moderation strategies. This duality reflects the dynamic political cultures in contemporary Ukraine, highlighting the state’s continuous development as a transitioning democracy.

The present study has several limitations. First, as previously mentioned, we lacked definitive information on applause moderation strategies on the studied talk shows. Although we assume partial applause moderation on RTP based on the provided information, we cannot make claims about which applause instances were moderated and which were not. Thus, our findings related to RQ4 must be interpreted with caution. Another limitation is that certain case-related findings have diminished relevance due to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has profoundly affected the Ukrainian political and media landscape. Notably, the once-prominent talk shows analyzed in this study no longer exist, and the most important Ukrainian channels were unified under the controversial wartime TV marathon United News, reported to negatively impact press freedom in Ukraine (Zinchenko, 2024).

Despite these changes, many of our general findings remain applicable and can inform future research. For instance, the political value structure identified in this study is likely to persist in the Ukrainian political sphere, albeit manifesting in different venues. Further research is needed to explore whether and how these political values have evolved since the onset of the full-scale war. At a broader level, the study demonstrates how analyzing content underlying implicit public opinion cues can enhance our understanding of the ways these cues shape people’s perceptions of public opinion. Such analysis offers a basis for making informed assumptions about the political values and other types of politically relevant information that cue recipients are likely to adopt and use as a framework for interpreting socio-political reality (Valenzuela et al., 2023). While focused on audience applause in Ukrainian political talk shows, the proposed approach has broader applicability for cross-country comparisons and for analyzing other types of implicit cues, including both authentic and strategically disseminated user reactions on social media platforms.

Footnotes

Appendix

Table A4.

Applause Distribution by Actor Groups.

Actor group (n)	Talk show		Statistics
Actor group (n)	FOS(n = 650)%	RTP(n = 1,072)%	χ²	Sig.	Cohen’s h
Politicians (604)	39.8	32.2	10.101	**	0.160
Civil servants and government officials (265)	14.5	16.0	0.580	ns	−0.042
Media and journalists (63)	2.6	4.3	2.766	ns	−0.092
Business professionals (17)	0.9	1.0	0.000	ns	−0.010
Experts and academics (141)	6.9	9.0	1.961	ns	−0.075
Legal professionals (34)	2.8	1.5	2.780	ns	0.089
Opinion leaders and celebrities (132)	18.0	1.4	155.216	***	0.639
Military (14)	0.5	1.0	0.976	ns	−0.067
NGO representatives and civil activists (53)	2.9	3.2	0.021	ns	−0.014
Volunteers (7)	1.1	0	NA	NA	0.208
Citizens (18)	2.6	0.1	22.506	***	0.264
Talk show host (366)	6.8	30.0	129.508	***	−0.634
Other (8)	0.6	0.4	NA	NA	0.035

Note. The table displays the percentages of applauded statements that individual actor groups received relative to the total applauded statements in the two talk shows. To identify significant differences between the shows, two-sample tests for equality of proportions with continuity correction were conducted. Proportional differences are highlighted in bold for a Cohen’s h value of 0.2 or greater. χ² values are not reported for “Volunteers” and “Other” actor groups due to small n.

Significance levels are marked as *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Kostiantyn Yanchenko

Notes

Author Biographies

Kostiantyn Yanchenko is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Communication Science of the Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany), focusing on political communication. His research has been published in, among others, The International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Mass Communication and Society, The International Journal of Press/Politics, and Studies in Communication and Media.

Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw is a professor of journalism and communication studies, with a focus on Digital Communication and Sustainability at the University of Hamburg. Her research focuses on the impact of digitalization and technological innovations on political communication and, in particular, the role of social network platforms and their use by citizens and political actors.

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What’s in a Cue? Decoding Political Values in Applauded Statements From Ukraine’s Leading Political Talk Shows

Abstract

Keywords

Public Opinion and Public Opinion Cues

Talk Show Audience Applause as an Implicit Public Opinion Cue

Studying Political Values Underlying Public Opinion Cues

Context: Ukrainian Political and Media System in the Study Period

Method

Data

Applauded Statements

Topics

Actor Groups

Value Frames

Findings

Applause Distribution by Talk Show, Topic, and Actor

Value Frames in the Applauded Statements

Identity-Oriented Value Frames

Governance-Oriented Value Frames

Value Frame Co-Occurrence

Applause Moderation Strategies

Discussion

Footnotes

Appendix

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

Author Biographies

References