Commentary on “Penetrating the ‘Black Box’: Financial Incentives for Enhancing the Quality of Physician Services,” by Douglas A. Conrad and Jon B. Christianson
Restricted accessOtherFirst published online September, 2004
Commentary on “Penetrating the ‘Black Box’: Financial Incentives for Enhancing the Quality of Physician Services,” by Douglas A. Conrad and Jon B. Christianson
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