This paper examines the lawsuits brought by state and local government entities against prescription opioid producers and sellers. It examines their potential liability as well as some of the defenses they might raise. The paper also discusses multidistrict litigation and government lawsuits in state court. It concludes that litigation is not the best solution to the opioid crisis.
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References
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This portion of the article is based on statements made by government plaintiffs in complaints against opioid producers and sellers filed by Ohio, the City of Chicago, New Hampshire, the City of Louisville, and the Cherokee Nation.
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