Nuclear power plant control rooms contain large numbers of identical or similar control and display components. The discrimination cues available for selecting a single component are frequently minimal. This situation can lead to substitution errors in which the wrong display is read or the wrong control is operated. An example of such an error is discussed in relation to a generic procedure sequence and remedial approaches are presented with respect to both original design and modification of existing control panels.
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