Investigating a new classification to describe the differences between Work-As-Imagined and Work-As-Done

Abstract

Standard operating procedures are vital in maintaining safe operations in high-risk industries such as the petrochemical industry. Despite significant safety management improvement, most incidents in these industries often attribute deviation or non-compliance with procedural steps as a causal factor. Even though workers do not always follow the exact procedure steps when performing their tasks, very few studies investigate the discrepancies between Work As Imagined (WAI) and Work As Done (WAD), particularly under normal working conditions. This study aims to identify and quantify the differences between WAI and WAD while conducting procedural tasks by operationalizing a coding framework. An actual work environment in a petrochemical facility was used to apply the framework to help decide if WAI aligns with WAD. Finally, a classification scheme is proposed and discussed to explain why workers do what they do during their routine work.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Alper

S. J.

Karsh

B. T.

(2009). A systematic review of safety violations in industry. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 41(4), 739–754. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.AAP.2009.03.013

Ashraf

A. M.

Son

Peres

S. C.

Sasangohar

(2021). Navigating operating procedures in everyday work in a petrochemical facility: A comparative analysis of WAI and WAD, 623–627. https://doi.org/10.1177/1071181321651210

Bullemer

P. T.

Kiff

Tharanathan

(2011). Common procedural execution failure modes during abnormal situations. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 814–818. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2011.06.007

Carvalho

P. V. R.

Benchekroun

T.-H.

Gomes

J. O.

(2010). Analysis of information exchange activities to actualize and validate situation awareness during shift changeovers in nuclear power plants. Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing & Service Industries, 22(2), 130–144. https://doi.org/10.1002/hfm.20201

Center for Chemical Process Safety. (2007). Guidelines for risk based process safety (1st ed.). Wiley-AIChE.

Dekker

(2003). Failure to adapt or adaptations that fail: contrasting models on procedures and safety. Applied Ergonomics, 34(3), 233–238. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0003-6870(03)00031-0

Dekker

(2005). Ten questions about human error: A new view of human factors and system safety. Taylor & Francis Group.

Hollnagel

(2012). FRAM: The functional resonance analysis method: Modelling complex socio-technical systems (1st ed.). CRC Press.

Peres

S. C.

Smith

Sasangohar

(2020). Worker-centered investigation of issues with procedural systems: Findings from interviews with a representative sample of workers in high-risk process industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 67, 104264. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JLP.2020.104264

10.

Provan

D. J.

Woods

D. D.

Dekker

S. W. A.

Rae

A. J.

(2020). Safety II professionals: How resilience engineering can transform safety practice. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 195, 106740. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2019.106740

11.

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. (2007, March). Investigation report: Refinery explosion and fire (Report No.2005-04-I-TX). https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=5596

12.

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. (2010, April). Investigation report Vol. 3: Drilling rig explosion and fire at the Macondo well (Report No. 2010-10-I-OS). https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=5992