As we move into NextGen (Next Generation) aviation operations, it becomes critical to ensure shared situational understanding and cooperative problem solving between flight crews and ATC. Doing so will entail identifying potential problems, as well as evaluating the likely impacts of specific operator and environmental characteristics on decision processes and outcomes. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) incident and accident reports were examined, with a focus on human factors issues, antecedents of errors and associated operational consequences. Results showed interrelationships between specific antecedents and errors, and the prevalence of attention errors, crew communication issues and monitoring/challenging errors in procedural errors and poor decisions. A model of how antecedents contribute to poor situational models and outcomes is proposed.
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