In the present experiments, we extended system-wide trust theory (SWT) to make predictions regarding in-vehicle automated devices. Reformulation of SWT into system-wide assessment theory (SWAT) was successful in predicting participants’ perceived reliability and trust ratings of in-vehicle automated devices when participants were presented with only a limited amount of information about the reliability of an existing in-vehicle automated device. Over a series of two related experiments, findings revealed that the initial reliability level impacted both subsequent reliability estimates and subsequent trust ratings of both specific and non-specific in-vehicle automated devices.
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