Rather than relying on authoritative political structures to solve the dilemmas
of governing the global commons, institutional perspectives show that governance can occur in situations where, at first glance, individual incentives for
short-term economic gain seem to proscribe collective action. In this regard, a
theoretical framework drawing on the study of common-pool resources explains effective institutional governance as the combination of internal design
features and exogenous issue-area factors. This study raises the question of
which institutional design principles provide for effective solutions for governing the commons. It does so in the context of international fisheries
commissions. These institutions are often less than adequate conservers offish.
Through an analysis of institutional goals and objectives, this study identifies
some design features of fisheries institutions associated with this lack of
conservation effectiveness, while at the same time identifying the institutional sources of the continuity afforded to participants by these enduring
institutions.
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