Protecting Wildlife from Trade: Japan's Involvement in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species

Abstract

The recent proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements sug gests that states have come to assume that such agreements, and resulting institutions, are effective. There is disagreement in the international rela tions theoretical literature, however, about whether membership in an inter national regime causes states to change their behaviors in ways they would not in the absence of the regime. This paper examines the behavior of Japan as a signatory to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES), and concludes that regimes, by changing the memberstate's cost/benefit calculation of a potential behaviorchange, can make a difference, but do not always do so. In Japan's case, CITES participation did lead to unexpected cessation of trade in elephant ivory and endangered sea turtle shells, but will not likely affect Japan's trade behavior regarding most marine species-including whales-and commercially impor tant tropical timber. The findings differ from the realist contention that regimes merely serve to codify existing balance of power relationships between sovereign states, and do not cause states to change their behaviors. The findings also differ from the institutionalist position that regimes represent a voluntary surrender of some degree of national sovereignty, and suggest that a regime's effectiveness will be limited by the political and economic sensitivity of the behavior changes it demands.