Abstract
The pollution haven hypothesis is widely used to explain the predatory relocation of foreign investors to emerging markets. However, the long-term effect of the pollution haven hypothesis remains a mystery, given the natural evolution of environmental regulations. This study proposes that the likelihood of foreign divestment in the emerging market increases when the regional environmental regulatory pressure becomes more stringent. Empirical support is obtained through a Cox proportional hazard model of 402 international joint ventures established in China in 2000, whose foreign divestment status is traced until 2017. The findings support the karmic debt of the pollution haven hypothesis; that is, foreign investors’ focus on avoiding environmental regulatory costs by relocating to emerging markets in the short run will backfire in the long run unless they bring something of value to the host market.
Keywords
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
