The Partisan Component to the Incumbency Advantage: 1956-1996

Abstract

The power of incumbency in congressional elections is widely accepted. Is there a partisan component to the incumbency advantage? The theories of divided government push in two directions. Jacobson's argument would lead one to believe that the Democrats should be advantaged. Fiorina's argument would lead one to believe that there should be no difference between the parties. Using the American National Election Studies of 1956 through 1996, one can see that there is little difference in the two parties' abilities to capitalize on the advantages incumbency confers. Both parties' incumbent members of the House seem to provide the particularized services that both Jacobson and Fiorina think are so important for retaining a seat in the House. Also, constituents view both parties' incumbents as being equally responsive on matters of public policy. Consequently, there is little reason to fear that the policymaking process is distorted by one party being more advantaged by incumbency than another. Last, the evidence, albeit indirect, lends support to the policy-balancing model of Fiorina.