Previous research suggests that groups increasingly dominate the se lection of federal court judges. We evaluate this conventional wisdom with longitudinal data tracing the appearance of organized interests at nearly 2,000 lower court confirmation hearings between 1945-1992. We find mixed support for the conventional wisdom. Organized interests do not appear more often before the Senate Judiciary Committee than in the past but there has been a considerable shift in the kinds of groups that testify. We also find that the incidence of controversial nominations has declined while the intensity of conflicts when they occur has increased. These changes, we suggest, reflect the evolution of differential group ac cess to the selection process as a function of shifting opportunities and incentives generated by broader political forces altering the electoral, policy, and institutional interests of the key players in the process.
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